




The Dissertation Committee for Xiajun Pan
certifies that this is the approved version of the following dissertation:
Optimization of Material Sourcing and Delivery
Operations, and Assortment Planning for Vertically







Optimization of Material Sourcing and Delivery
Operations, and Assortment Planning for Vertically
Differentiated Products and Bundles
by
Xiajun Pan, B.S.; M.S.
DISSERTATION
Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of
The University of Texas at Austin
in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements
for the Degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN
December 2009
Dedicated to my daughter Alice Xinyun Li and my husband Xiaolin Andy Li.
Acknowledgments
I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my advisors Professors
Anant Balakrishnan and Dorothee Honhon for their valuable guidance, insightful
ideas, continuous encouragement and help on my study, research, career, and life.
I feel so fortunate to have them as my supervisors.
I am deeply grateful to Professors Leon Lasdon, Steve Gilbert, and David
Morton for being on my dissertation committee and giving their advice and guid-
ance regarding my research and career. I’m also very thankful to Professor Qi
Annabelle Feng for helpful research discussion, advice, and friendship.
I would like to thank Sree Jonnalagedda and Gang Li for helpful research
discussion and sharing our life. I would also like to thank other friends in Austin
for their friendship and help, which makes my study at Austin enjoyable and
fruitful.
I am also grateful to the staff especially Hillary Patterson, Caroline Walls
from Information Risk and Operation Management department for their assis-
tance and support.
My special thanks go to my parents, Mr. Chaoping Pan and Ms. Xuejuan
Yao, and other loving family members, for their unselfish love and support, and
my husband, Dr. Xiaolin Li, for his advice, continuous encouragement, endless
love, and spiritual support. Finally, I would like to express my greatest appreci-
v
ation to my daughter, Alice Xinyun Li, for her understanding, love, and support
beyond her age, who has been making my life so beautiful.
vi
Optimization of Material Sourcing and Delivery
Operations, and Assortment Planning for Vertically
Differentiated Products and Bundles
Publication No.
Xiajun Pan, Ph.D.
The University of Texas at Austin, 2009
Supervisors: Anant Balakrishnan
Dorothee Honhon
Optimization of materials supply and inbound logistic operations has be-
come increasingly important as firms have continued to pursue outsourcing op-
tions. Further, the proliferation of products and advances in information technol-
ogy have greatly impacted retailers’ marketing strategies in the past decade. In
this dissertation, we address how to optimally develop integrated sourcing and de-
livery planning, and how to optimally offer vertically differentiated products and
bundles. In the first essay, we address a combined sourcing and delivery planning
optimization problem, which is motivated by a practical problem facing materials
and supply planners for construction projects in a leading corporation. We de-
velop a decision support model and an effective solution approach for integrated
sourcing and delivery planning for bulk materials. This approach, implemented
and currently in use at the company to support material delivery planning for
vii
track maintenance projects, has yielded significant savings of millions of dollars
annually. In the second essay, we study the problem of a retailer managing a
category of vertically differentiated products. We consider two settings: the ex-
ogenous prices case and the endogenous prices case. In the former case, the selling
prices are exogenously determined and the retailer’s only decision is to determine
the set of products to offer. In the latter case, the retailer also determines the
selling prices. We develop efficient methods to identify the optimal solutions for
both cases and provide valuable insights and guidelines for practitioners. In the
third essay, we study how to choose the optimal bundling strategy for a retailer
offering vertically differentiated information goods. We characterize conditions
under which pure bundling and mixed bundling strategies are optimal respec-
tively. We provide efficient methods to identify which individual components to
offer, whether or not to offer a bundle containing all the components and how to
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Optimization of materials supply and inbound logistic operations has be-
come increasingly important as firms have continued to pursue outsourcing op-
tions. In Chapter 1, motivated by a practical problem facing procurement and
logistics planners at a leading U.S. company, we develop an optimization model
to address an integrated sourcing and delivery planning problem. Given full-load
customer demands, with delivery time window restrictions, and available sources
of supply, the problem entails selecting the supplier(s) to use for each customer,
assigning vehicle types to deliveries, and sequencing the materials pickup and
delivery operations to meet all the delivery requirements on time at minimum
total sourcing and delivery cost. Sequentially solving the sourcing and delivery
problems can lead to solutions with high costs or even infeasible solutions due
to supplier capacity constraints, customer delivery time windows, and limited
number of vehicles. Researchers have worked on sourcing and material deliv-
ery problem separately; however, little attention has been paid to the combined
sourcing and delivery problem. We formulate this problem as an integer program-
ming model. To effectively solve the integrated sourcing and delivery planning
problem, we develop several families of valid inequalities to enhance the model
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and propose a linear programming-based heuristic. When applied real problem
instances from the company, our solution method provides near-optimal sourcing
and delivery schedules within reasonable computational time. Estimated savings
from using our integrated modeling approach exceeds three million dollars per
year. This optimization model is a valuable decision support tool for tactical
planning, capable of performing what-if analysis to provide useful managerial
insights.
The proliferation of products have greatly impacted retailers’ marketing
strategies. A typical retailer carries dozens to hundreds of products in a popular
product category. Advances in information technology make it possible for on-
line retailers (E-tailers) to offer thousands of products in a category due to the
absence of shelf space restriction, the huge costs savings of warehouse and the
absence of walk-in customers. For instance, Newegg (www.newegg.com) carries
more than 400 different USB flash drives and 1400 different televisions. The ac-
tual number of products that Newegg can choose to include in their assortment
is even greater since not every brand and model is offered. Given such a variety
of products, what products should a retailer offer in order to maximize the profit
and how much should the retailer to charge for each offered product? A naive
way is to enumerate all possible combinations of products with different prices
and identify the most profitable one. However, the complexity of such method
increases exponentially with the number of products that the retailer can choose
from. To develop an efficient algorithm to identify the optimal set of products to
offer and optimally price them is an important and challenging problem for large
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retailers. In Chapter 3, we consider the problem of a retailer managing a cate-
gory of vertically differentiated products, i.e., products that differ in their quality
level. The retailer has to pay a fixed cost per product included in the assortment
and a variable cost per product sold. Quality levels, fixed and variable costs are
exogenously determined. Customers differ in their valuation of quality and, given
an assortment of products, choose the one (if any) that maximizes their utility.
First we consider a setting in which the selling prices are also fixed and the re-
tailer’s only decision is to determine the set of products to offer. We find that
the optimal assortment(s) depend(s) on the distribution of customer valuations
and might include dominated products, i.e., products which are less attractive
than at least one other product, on every possible dimension. We develop an
efficient algorithm to identify the optimal assortment(s). Second, we consider a
setting in which the retailer also determines the selling prices. We show that,
under some mild conditions, the optimal assortment(s) does(do) not include any
dominated product and does not vary with the distribution of customer valua-
tions. We develop several efficient algorithms to identify the optimal assortment
and optimally price the products.
Bundling has become a pervasive pricing strategy for sellers to increase
their market share. For instance, telecommunication companies offer internet,
phone, and TV services separately, as well as the bundle of these services; cus-
tomers can choose to purchase an airline ticket, book a hotel, and rent a car
separately or purchase a package including all the above products; the iTunes
store sells songs individually as well as albums containing multiple songs. How
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do these sellers decide prices for each individual product and the bundle(s) in
order to maximize the profit? In Chapter 4, we address the assortment planning
problem for vertically differentiated information goods with price bundling. Mo-
tivated by the successful business of iTunes, we consider a special mixed bundling
strategy: offering individual products, called components, and a bundle contain-
ing all the components. Customers agree on the ranking of popularity of each
component. Each customer gets a utility from a product that is increasing in
the popularity level and decreasing in the price. Depending on the utility that a
customer gets from components and the bundle, he either makes no purchase, pur-
chases one component, purchases multiple components, or purchases the bundle.
The retailer pays a variable cost for each component/bundle sold. We address
the questions about what components to offer individually, whether to offer the
bundle, how much to charge for each offered component and/or the bundle. We
develop efficient methods to identify the optimal solution. Moreover, we consider
some special cases where the variable cost is the same for each component and/or
the selling price is the same for each component, and provide valuable insights.
For instance, we show that for a new product, low bundling pricing strategy is
desirable to penetrate the early stage market. Then, as the market matures, a
higher bundling price is optimal while the total market share increases.
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Chapter 2
Optimization of Integrated Souring and
Delivery Planning for Bulk materials
2.1 Introduction
Increasing transportation costs and trends toward more outsourcing have
led firms to emphasize optimization of their supply and inbound logistics op-
erations. Motivated by a practical problem facing materials supply planners
for construction projects in a leading corporation, the paper addresses a joint
sourcing and delivery planning optimization problem. In this problem, a set of
geographically dispersed “customers” or projects require materials in bulk, i.e.,
in full vehicle loads, by specified due dates. We can select from among alterna-
tive suppliers for each customer. These suppliers vary in their prices, production
capacities, and locations (and hence distances from customers). The planning
problem requires selecting the suppliers to use for each customer, and sequencing
the material pickup and delivery operations using available vehicles in order to
meet the delivery requirements at minimum total procurement and delivery cost.
Sequentially solving the sourcing and delivery problems can lead to solutions with
high costs or even infeasible solutions due to supplier capacity constraints, cus-
tomer delivery time windows, and limited number of vehicles. In the literature,
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researchers have worked on sourcing and material delivery problems separately,
but little attention has been paid to the integrated sourcing and delivery problem
(ISDP). The goal of this paper is to develop a decision support model and an
effective solution approach for the ISDP. This approach, implemented and cur-
rently in use at the company to support material delivery planning activities, has
yielded significant savings of over a million dollars annually.
Each year the company selects and plans the projects to be completed in
the coming year. These projects require one or more full-loads of materials that
can be supplied by alternative suppliers, and the materials must be delivered to
the project sites before projects start. The previous planning process was manual,
and could result in delayed deliveries and high procurement and transportation
costs, which motivated us to address the ISDP that we describe next.
The ISDP entails three sets of interrelated decisions: sourcing, vehicle
assignment, and routing. The sourcing decision requires selecting one or more
suppliers from among the candidate suppliers for each customer. The prices
offered by suppliers vary, as do the supplier-to-customer distances. Moreover,
suppliers differ in the amount of material they can supply. These restrictions
stem from limited weekly production and loading capacities, as well as limitations
on the total amount of material that a supplier can provide over the planning
horizon. We consider multiple vehicle types that differ in the time they require to
pickup and deliver each load of material. The vehicle assignment decision entails
selecting the vehicle type(s) that will serve each customer. Finally, the routing
and scheduling decision requires sequencing the pickup and delivery activities
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for each vehicle so as to deliver on time to each customer while meeting the
supply capacity restrictions. We aim to minimize the total cost of supplying
all customers on time. This cost includes: (i) material procurement cost, which
depends on the amount purchased from each supplier; (ii) transportation cost,
which depends on the travel distance as well as the amount of the load; and,
(iii) vehicle assignment cost, which varies by vehicle type and customer. Thus,
the integrated sourcing and delivery problem seeks the supplier selection, vehicle
assignment, and delivery sequencing plan that minimizes the total procurement,
transportation, and vehicle assignment cost. The main purpose of the model is
to support tactical planning of procurement and vehicle deployment during the
planning horizon, for instance, six months to a year. The model can help address
questions such as the following: do we have adequate cost-effective sources of
supply close to customers, do we have adequate vehicles, can we meet all the
deliveries on time, and how do we deploy the vehicles?
In the literature, several studies have addressed sourcing issues. Murthy
et al. (2004) review the literature on optimization models for sourcing planning.
Ustun & Demirtas (2008) provide a survey of optimization models for supplier
selection problems with multi-criteria. The existing literature on sourcing focus
on minimizing the purchasing cost and/or associated operational cost subject
to different kinds of constraints. The constraints include satisfying the buyer’s
requirement for product quality and service level, and/or supplier capacity con-
straint, etc. Some models consider quantity discounts. To our best knowledge, no
study has considered sourcing and delivery planning simultaneously as the ISDP
7
does.
The Vehicle Routing Problem with Time Windows (VRPTW) is a core
model to reduce delivery costs. This problem has been well studied in the litera-
ture. The VRPTW focuses on designing minimum cost multi-stop delivery routes
for vehicles based at a single depot, given the locations, demands, and delivery
time windows of customers. Researchers have developed numerous optimization
methods and heuristics for this problem. Kallehauge et al. (2005) and Cordeau
et al. (2007) provide a comprehensive survey of literature on the VRPTW. The
ISDP differs from the VRPTW in the following ways. Typically, VRPTW models
consider identical vehicles, with each vehicle starting and ending at the same de-
pot. Accordingly, these models do not include sourcing and supplier assignment
decisions. Dondo & Cerd (2007) address the multi-depot VRPTW in which each
vehicle is housed in one of the depots, and customers can be supplied by any de-
pot with no capacity constraints and no difference in prices of materials. For this
problem, the authors propose a three-phase hierarchical hybrid approach com-
bining a heuristic clustering algorithm with an optimization framework. Unlike
the ISDP, for all the VRPTW problems studied in the literature, each customer’s
requirement is less than a full load, and so vehicles can serve multiple customers
on each trip.
Bianco et al. (1995), Desaulniers et al. (1998), and Arunapuram et al.
(2003) sstudy variants of vehicle routing problems with full-loads and time win-
dows. Specifically, they consider the problem of scheduling a fleet of vehicles
located at several depots to perform a set of tasks within specified time win-
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dows at minimum cost. Each task requires transporting one or more full-loads
of material from one location to another location. These models do not include
sourcing decisions, and only minimize the empty-load transportation cost. The
papers develop different models for this problem, and propose branch-and-bound
solution algorithms using column generation schemes.
As discussed above, past work has addressed sourcing problems and rout-
ing problems with time windows. No paper has worked on the joint sourcing and
routing problem with full-loads and time windows. The ISDP model we develop
and solve in this essay seeks to fill this gap. In particular, the ISDP decides which
suppliers to assign to each customer, which period(s) to serve the customer based
on due dates and supplier capacities, which vehicle to use for each delivery, and
how to route the vehicles to satisfy these supplier assignment and timing choices.
We must consider these decisions simultaneously in order to obtain an optimal
sourcing and delivery plan.
We model the ISDP as a large-scale optimization problem which is com-
putationally intractable (NP-hard). So, we focus on developing polyhedral ap-
proaches to generate near-optimal solutions within reasonable computation time.
For this purpose, we identify several sets of inequalities based on the character-
istics of fractional solutions to strengthen the model’s linear programming (LP)
relaxation. The strengthened model (the base model with the added inequalities)
reduces the computational effort for exact procedures such as branch-and-bound,
and improves the quality of heuristics solutions. The application of our approach
to actual sourcing and delivery planning problems demonstrates that our solu-
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tion methodology is quite effective. Furthermore, we obtain annual cost savings of
over 10% on average compared to the total cost using a heuristic approach that
the company developed. The results show that our model provides significant
savings on the expensive construction projects. Moreover, the model developed
in this paper has wide applications in industry, for instance, transporting corn
from farms to ethanol refineries, shipping gas from oil refineries to distribution
centers, supplying wood for furniture makers or building sites.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 defines the
ISDP formally and presents its mathematical programming formulation. Section
2.3 studies characteristics of the LP solution and develops various classes of valid
inequalities to eliminate fractional LP solutions. Section 2.4 describes our solution
method, including the preprocessing rules, the cutting plane procedure that we
use to add valid inequalities, and the LP-based heuristic. Section 2.5 presents
the implementation and impact of the ISDP model, and Section 2.6 concludes
our work.
2.2 Problem Description and Model Formulation
2.2.1 Problem Context
The ISDP is motivated by the annual material supply planning task for
construction projects. After the geographically-dispersed construction jobs are
scheduled by specified dates, the corresponding materials, available from different
suppliers, must be delivered to the job sites using a limited number of vehicles
before the jobs start. Suppliers differ in their prices and supply time windows.
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Some suppliers are open all the year round while others are open only in certain
periods; for instance, suppliers in northern states cannot supply material in win-
ter due to the severe weather. In addition, each supplier has a weekly production
capacity and also an annual supply capacity. Vehicles of different types differ in
the time spent on loading material at the supplier and unloading at the customer
sites. Unloading at the customer site incurs additional costs that we capture
using vehicle assignment costs. Hence, for each customer, the material can be
delivered by vehicles of different types but with different assignment costs. This
cost depends on the type of vehicles assigned to each customer. The ISDP consid-
ers which suppliers to serve for each customer, which vehicle type to use for each
customer, and how to route the available vehicles to meet delivery requirements.
These decisions together minimize the total cost of supplying all customers on
time during the planning horizon. The cost includes: material procurement cost,
which depends on the amount purchased from each supplier; transportation cost,
which depends on the distance from the supplier to each customer, the return
distance from each customer to the next supplier, and the per-mile equipment
and consumables cost for the loaded and empty vehicle; and vehicle assignment
cost, which varies by vehicle type and customer.
To model the integrated sourcing and delivery decisions, we exploit the
characteristics of the company construction application context. In this setting,
each customer (or job) requires one or more full loads or nearly full-loads deliver-
ies, and so the vehicle can only deliver to one customer per trip. The trip consists
of going to the supplier location, loading the vehicle, traveling to the customer
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site, unloading the vehicle, and then traveling to the next supplier (assigned to
the next customer that the vehicle needs to serve). The planners assume that
the forward trip time (to be loaded at a supplier, travel to a customer site, to be
unloaded at the customer) is an integer multiple of the base period, as is a return
trip time (travel to the next customer site). These problem features permit us to
develop a time indexed model for the ISDP as described next.
2.2.2 Model Formulation
Let J be the set of customers, Q the set of suppliers, and V the set of
vehicle types. We index the time periods of the planning horizon from t = 1 to n,
and define T = 1, 2, , n as the set of base periods. Let Dj denote the demand, in
terms of number of deliveries (of full or nearly full-loads) required for customer
j, to be delivered in the time window TJ(j) ⊆ T , with an average quantity of
Bj per delivery. For each customer j ∈ J , let Q(j) denote the subset of suppliers
that can supply customer j, and R(j) the subset of suppliers to which vehicles
can return after a delivery to this customer. These subsets may not include all
suppliers because of travel distance restrictions and supplier availability. Each
supplier q ∈ Q can supply material in the time window TQ(q) ⊆ T . Let Iq and
Gqt represent, respectively, supplier q’s initial inventory and production quantity
in period t. In addition, this supplier can supply no more than Mq units during
the horizon. The set J(q) ⊆ Jrepresents the subset of customers that supplier q
can serve. Let Nv denote the number of available vehicles of type v. Vehicles can
enter and leave the system at any period. Once a vehicle leaves the system, it can
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not re-enter. Vehicles of type v take time units, an integer multiple of the base
period, to load at supplier q, travel to customer j, and unload at customer j, and
require periods to travel to the next supplier q. The events happen as follows.
For each supplier q in an operational period t, vehicles can enter the system at
supplier q, or arrive at the supplier from customers at the beginning of period t,
and then take time units to be loaded at supplier q, travel to customer j ∈ J(q),
and to be unloaded at this customer site. After unloaded at the beginning of
period t+ τ vqj , vehicles may leave the system, or take τ
v
jq′ time units to travel to
the next supplier q′ ∈ R(j)(see Figure 2.1).
q,t
' 'j j qt
v
y∑ vqjtx 'jq t
v
y




Figure 2.1: Event sequence diagram
We consider three types of costs. Let Fqj and Ejq denote the transportation
cost per delivery from supplier q to customer j (full-load transportation cost) and
from customer j to supplier q (empty-load transportation cost) respectively. The
procurement price from supplier q is Pq per unit and the vehicle assignment cost
at customer j by a vehicle of type v is Cvj per delivery.
To model the ISDP as an integer program, we define the following decision
variables. For each customer j ∈ J , each supplier q ∈ Q(j), each vehicle v ∈ V ,
and every period t ∈ TQ(q) and t + τ vqj ∈ TJ(j) , the integer variable x
v
qjt
represents the number of vehicles of type v that start to load material at supplier q
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and travel to customer j at the beginning of period t. This variable combines the
supplier-to-customer assignment, vehicle-to-customer assignment, and delivery
scheduling decisions. To model the return trips, let yvjqt denote the number of
vehicles of type v that start to unload material at customer j and travel to supplier
q at the beginning of period t, for all j ∈ J , v ∈ V , q ∈ R(j), t ∈ TJ(j) and
t+ τ vjq ∈ TQ(q). We define r
v
qt as the number of vehicles of type v that enter the
system at supplier q at the beginning of period t ∈ TQ(q), and svjt as the number
of vehicles of type v that leave the system after delivering to customer j at the
beginning of period t, where t−1 ∈ TJ(j). Using these integer decision variables,
we can formulate the ISDP as the following optimization problem. Appendix A
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xvqjt for all v ∈ V, q ∈ Q, t ∈ TQ(q), (2.5)
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jt for all v ∈ V, j ∈ J, t ∈ TJ(j), (2.6)








rvqt ≥ 0, integer for all v ∈ V, q ∈ Q, t ∈ TQ(q), and (2.7c)
svjt ≥ 0, integer for all v ∈ V, j ∈ J, t− 1 ∈ TJ(j). (2.7d)
The objective function (2.1) minimizes the total material purchasing,
transportation, and vehicle assignment costs. Constraint (2.2) combines each
supplier’s production capacity constraint and total supply capacity during the
planning horizon. This constraint specifies that, in every period t, the cumula-
tive amount of material supplied by this supplier must not exceed the cumulative
capacity (plus initial inventory) or the total supply capacity. Constraint (2.3) en-
sures that only the available vehicles can be used, while constraint (2.4) specifies
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that each customer’s demand must be satisfied. Constraints (2.5)-(2.6) are flow
conservation constraints at each customer and supplier location in every period
during which they are operational. Constraints (2.5) specify that the inflow of
vehicles to a supplier must equal the outflow (number of vehicles delivering ma-
terial to customers) at the beginning of each period. The inflow is the number
of vehicles entering the system plus the number of vehicles returning after deliv-
ering to customers at the beginning of the period. Constraint (2.6) states that,
after each delivery, the vehicle must go to the next supplier or leave the system.
Constraints (2.7a)- (2.7d) are the integrality requirements.
We refer to this formulation as a vehicle flow model since it considers the
total number of vehicles arriving/leaving customer and supplier locations in each
operational period rather than the routing of individual vehicles. From the vehicle
flow solutions, we can easily obtain individual vehicle routes using a path decom-
position method. Alternatively, we can formulate the problem using a vehicle
indexed formulation that directly models the individual vehicle routes. However,
this latter formulation vastly increases the number of variables and constraints.
Moreover, this disaggregate vehicle-indexed formulation does not provide tighter
linear-programming bounds. The larger problem size combined with the symme-
try in the vehicle-indexed model can significantly increase computational time.
The ISDP model can easily incorporate user-specific requirements, such
as: (a) pre-specified assignments of vehicle types to suppliers or customers; (b)
delivery grouping, due to restrictions on the set of customers that must be served
by the same vehicle type, and/or customers requiring consecutive deliveries; and,
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(c) other costs and capacities, for instance, maximum number of loads per week
at each supplier. Incorporating such requirements needs only adding some vari-
ables, constraints, and/or terms in the objective function without changing the
underlying model structure.
A special case of the ISDP model is the single vehicle and single supplier
problem with unlimited supply capacity, i.e., one vehicle makes deliveries to all
customers supplied by one single source without any capacity constraint. This
problem is polynomially solvable. Based on the demand of customers, we can
identify the last delivery period t′ when the vehicle completes all deliveries and
leaves the system. Among all the customers with due date later than period t′−1,
we identify the customer j with the largest distance between the supplier and the
customer. The optimal solution makes the last delivery to customer j in period t′
and to other customers in increasing order of due dates before period t′. Another
special case of the ISDP model is the single vehicle and customers with unit
demand problem, where each customer has a pre-specified unique source with
unlimited supply capacity. In this case, the problem only involves determining
the delivery sequence. We can polynomially transform the Traveling Salesman
Problem (TSP) to this special case; therefore, the ISDP is NP-hard. To effectively
solve this problem, we propose several classes of valid inequalities to strengthen
the model’s LP relaxation in the next section.
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2.3 Strengthening the ISDP Model Formulation
To effectively solve the ISDP, we have developed several families of valid
inequalities that strengthen the model formulation, thereby increasing the linear
programming lower bound. During the past decade, researchers have successfully
applied polyhedral approaches to solve many different classes of difficult integer
programming problems; see, for instance, Bard et al. (2002) for the VRPTW. This
experience has shown that adding valid inequalities not only reduces the enumer-
ation effort for branch-and-bound and but can also help generate good heuristic
solutions. Developing valid inequalities requires understanding the problem and
solution structure to identify why and how the linear programming relaxation
can reduce cost by selecting fractional values for the decision variables. For the
ISDP, fractional solutions mainly stem from the LP relaxation’s attempt to re-
duce the transportation cost. We illustrate how the LP relaxation of [ISDP] can
achieve a lower optimal value than the IP value by examples before we develop
valid inequalities. Next, we present the following three sets of valid inequalities to
eliminate the fractional solutions: delivery consolidation inequalities, cumulative
deliveries inequalities, and residual delivery inequalities. For notation simplifica-
tion, we drop the index v since all the inequalities apply for each vehicle type
v.
2.3.1 Delivery Consolidation Inequality
Consider the following simple problem with two customers j1 and j2, two
suppliers A and B, and one vehicle. Each customer requires one full-load of
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material that can be delivered in any period of the first four periods, i.e., by the
end of fourth period. Customer j1 is close to supplier A (τAj1 = 1 ) and far from
supplier B (τBj1 = 2 ), while customer j2 is close to supplier B ( τBj2 = 1 ) and
far from supplier A (τAj2 = 2 ). So, the transportation cost from customer j1 to
supplier B is high, as is the transportation cost from customer j2 to supplier A.
To avoid these transportation costs, the linear programming relaxation schedules
two ”half” deliveries to each of the customers. In particular, it assigns half a
vehicle to deliver material from supplier A to customer j1 in periods 1 and 3, and
the other half vehicle to deliver material from supplier B to customer j2 during
these two periods (see Figure 2.2). In contrast, the optimal solution requires first
picking up material at supplier A and delivering to customer j1 in period 1, and
then traveling to supplier B (from customer j1’s location) in the next two periods,
picking up material, and delivering to customer j2 in the fourth period (see Figure
2.3). To eliminate the fractional LP solution, we can impose the requirement
that, in each period, a vehicle can travel from a supplier q to a customer j with
unit demand only if the vehicle arrives at q from another customer (other than
customer j) or enters the system at the beginning of this period. Let J1 denote
the subset of customers with unit demand. Mathematically, we can express this




yj′q(t−τj′q) + rqt for allj ∈ J1, q ∈ Q(j), t ∈ TQ(q). (2.8)
We call constraint (2.8) the delivery consolidation inequality. Adding this
constraints eliminates the previous LP solution and obtains the optimal IP solu-
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Figure 2.3: IP solution of Example 1
Proposition 2.3.1. The delivery inequality (2.8) is valid for the ISDP and tightens
the model’s LP relaxation.
2.3.2 Cumulative Deliveries Inequality
Consider another problem with four customers (customer j1 to j4), two
suppliers A and B, and one vehicle. Each customer requires one full-load of ma-
terial by period 10. Customers j1 and j2 are close to supplier A (τAj1 = τAj2 = 1
)and far from supplier B(τBj1 = τBj2 = 2 ), while customers 3 and 4 are close to
supplier B ( τBj3 = τBj4 = 1 )and far from supplier A ( τAj3 = τAj4 = 2). Corre-
spondingly, the transportation cost from customer j1 (customer j2) to supplier B
is high, as is the transportation cost from customer j3 (customer j4) to supplier
A. To save these high transportation costs, the linear programming relaxation
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assigns ”half” A vehicle to deliver material from supplier A to customer j1 and
customer j2 alternately and the other half vehicle to make deliveries to customer
j3 and customer j4 from supplier B alternately (see Figure 2.4). However, the
optimal solution as shown in Figure 2.5 first makes deliveries from supplier A
to customers j1 and j2 in the first three delivery periods , and then travels to
supplier B (from customer j2’s location) to deliver material to customers j3 and
j4 in the remaining periods. The delivery consolidation inequality (2.8) cannot
cut off the fractional solution. Observe that only half A vehicle makes delivery to
each customer while all customer demands are fully met. We use J ′ to represent
the customer subset consisting of customer j1 and j2. Let A subsystem consist
of customers in J ′, supplier A, and time interval [t1, t2] = [1, 7]. Then, the num-
ber of vehicles in the subsystem is while the proportion of satisfied demand is
1. We can eliminate this fractional solution by requiring that at least one vehi-
cle devotes to each customer with fully met demand. The following cumulative




































for all q ∈ Q, t1, t2 ∈ TQ(q), t1 + 1 ≤ t2, J
′ ⊆ J, j∗ ∈ J ′ (2.9)















Figure 2.4: LP solution of Example 2
t=1 t=2
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B B j4j3
Figure 2.5: IP solution of Example 2
vehicles entering the subsystem at supplier q and customer subset J ′ as shown
in Figure 2.6. The dot-dashed line represents the flow entering the subsystem
at supplier q from outside (the first term); the dashed line and the dotted lines
indicate the flow entering the subsystem at customer subset J ′ from supplier q
(the second term) and from other suppliers (the third term) respectively, the
dot-dot-dashed line and the solid lines represent the flow entering the subsystem
at supplier q from customers in subset J ′ (the fourth term) and customers not
in J ′ (the last term) respectively. We call these five terms flow from outside
system, flow from inside supplier, flow from outside suppliers, flow from inside
customers, and flow from outside customers. The LHS includes the vehicles in
the subsystem that can make delivery from supplier q in the time interval. So, we
take into account the flow from insider supplier (the second term) not later than
t1 − 1 and t2 − τqj − τjq, and the flow from inside customers (the fourth term)
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not later than t1 − 1 and t2 − τjq. This inequality specifies that, for any subset of
customers J ′, supplier q, and time interval [t1, t2], the number of vehicles entering
this subsystem must equal or exceed the proportion of the total demand for each
customer j∗ ∈ J ′that supplier q serves in the time interval. The cumulative
deliveries inequality is effective only for time intervals with at least one period



























Figure 2.6: Number of vehicles in a subsystem
Notice that the second and third terms in the LHS of inequality (2.9)
(the dashed line and dotted lines in Figure 2.6) represent the number of vehicles
entering the subsystem at customers in J ′. Actually, we only need to include these
vehicles if they go to supplier q, and so we can strengthen this inequality by using





yjqt ) in time interval [t1, t1 + τqj − 1]
(shown in grey box in Figure 2.6). In addition, we do not need to include the
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number of vehicles entering at supplier q and then immediately serving customers
not in subset J ′in period t1, i.e., we can exclude
∑
j /∈J ′ xqjt1 from the last two
terms in the LHS of inequality (2.9) representing the number of vehicles entering







































for all q ∈ Q, t1, t2 ∈ TQ(q), t1 + 1 ≤ t2, J
′ ⊆ J, j∗ ∈ J
Furthermore, we can generalize the cumulative deliveries inequality for a
subset of suppliers Q′, i.e., for a subset of supplierQ′, a subset of customers J ′, and
time interval [t1, t2], the number of vehicles entering this subsystem from outside
must equal or exceed the proportion of the total demand for each customer j∗ ∈ J ′
that the subset of suppliers Q′ serve in the time interval. Let τjQ′ = minq∈Q′τjq
denote the shortest return trip time from customer j to among any supplier
q ∈ Q′, and τQ′j = minq∈Q′τqj denote the shortest forward trip time from among
any supplier q ∈ Q′ to customer j. We use z to represent the total number of
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for all Q′ ⊆ Q, t1, t2 ∈ TQ(q), t1 + 1 ≤ t2, J
′ ⊆ J, j∗ ∈ J (2.10)
Proposition 2.3.2. The cumulative deliveries inequality (2.10) is valid for the
ISDP and tightens the model’s LP relaxation.
2.3.3 Residual Capacity Inequality
Observe that the cumulative deliveries inequality is effective only when
the number of vehicles in the system is less than one since the RHS of constraint
(2.10) is at most one. Consider an example with two customers j1 and j2, two
suppliers A and B, and three vehicles. Customer j1 demands three full loads
of material by period 3, and customer j2 requires three full-loads of material
due in period 4. Customer j1 is close to supplier A (τAj1 = 1 ) and far from
supplier B (τBj1 = 2 ), while customer j2 is close to supplier B ( τBj2 = 1) and
far from supplier A ( τAj2 = 2). To avoid the high transportation cost from
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customer j1 to supplier B, the linear programming relaxation assigns 3/2 vehicles
to make deliveries to customer j1 from supplier A, and the other 3/2 vehicles to
deliver materials from supplier B to customer j2 (see Figure 2.7). In contrast, the
optimal solution shown in Figure 2.8 requires that one vehicle continuously makes
deliveries to customer j2 from supplier B and one vehicle delivers to customer j1
from supplier A in the first three periods, and the other one vehicle makes delivery
to customer j1 from supplier A in the first period, and then travels to supplier
B, picks up materials, and delivers to customer j2 in the remaining periods. The
cumulative deliveries inequality cannot eliminate this fractional solution. The
residual capacity inequality developed next can cut off this fractional solution.
Before presenting the residual capacity inequality, we introduce some additional
notation. For any time interval [t1, t2], customer subsets J
′ and J ′′ with J ′′ ⊆ J ′,
and supplier subset Q′, let W denote the total demand of customers in subset
J” that can be satisfied in time interval [t1, t2]. We compute W by summing up
the demands of all customers in subset J” whose due date is later than period
t1 − 1. Let τQ′J ′′ = minj∈J ′′τQ′j + minj∈J ′′τjQ′ denote the shortest trip time
among suppliers in Q′ and customers in J ′′, and U = ⌊(t2 − t1 + 1)/τQ′J ′′⌋ denote
the maximum number of deliveries that a vehicle can make to customer subset
J ′′ from supplier subset Q′ in the time interval. Define K = ⌈W/U⌉ as the
minimum number of vehicles needed to satisfy demand W , λ = KU − W as
the excess capacity, and R = (U − λ) as the residual capacity. The residual
capacity inequality requires that, the last vehicle must make at least R deliveries
if the number of vehicles serving the system is less than the minimum number
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of vehicles needed to satisfy the demand. Let z denote the number of vehicles in
the subsystem of supplier subset Q′, customer subset J ′ in time interval [t1, t2].








xqjt +R(K − Z) ≤W
for all Q′ ⊆ Q, t1, t2 ∈ TQ(q), t1 + 1 ≤ t2, J
′ ⊆ J, J ′′ ⊆ J ′ (2.11)
In the example shown in Figure 2.7, let time interval [t1, t2] = [1, 3], cus-
tomer subset J ′ = j1, J
′′ = j1, supplier subset Q
′ = A. We can compute U = 2,
W = 3, K = 2, and R = 1. The LHS (= 7/2) of constraint (2.11) is greater than






















Figure 2.8: IP solution of examples 3 for residual capacity inequality
For a vehicle entering the subsystem from customer j /∈ J ′ or supplier q /∈
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Q′ at time t, the residual capacity R′(t)of this vehicle is min(R, ⌊(t2 − t)/τQ′J ′⌋).
For a vehicle leaving the subsystem through customer j ∈ J ′ or supplier q ∈ Q′
at time t, we can add terms to compensate the possible loss of vehicle capacity
R′′(t) = max{0, R − ⌊(t + 1 − t1)/τQ′J ′⌋}. Therefore, we can further strengthen
the inequality by accounting for late arriving and early exiting vehicles within










































































xqjt +RK − z
′ ≤W
for all Q′ ⊆ Q, t1, t2 ∈ TQ(q), t1 + 1 ≤ t2, J
′ ⊆ J, J ′′ ⊆ J ′ (2.12)
Proposition 2.3.3. The residual capacity inequality (2.12) is valid for the ISDP
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and tightens the models LP relaxation.
In summary, motivated by examples shown above, we developed three
classes of valid inequalities delivery consolidation inequality, cumulative deliveries
inequality, and residual capacity inequality to tighten the base model. The first
class of inequality includes one constraint for each choice of customer j ∈ J1,
supplier q ∈ Q(j), period t ∈ TQ(q), while the other two classes of inequalities
each contain one constraint for subsets of customers, suppliers, and time interval.
Since there are exponential numbers of such choices, we add violated cumulative
delivery and residual capacity inequalities via a cutting plane procedure using
heuristic separation methods, as discussed next.
2.4 Methodology
To solve the ISDP effectively, we first preprocess problems by eliminating
some variables to reduce the problem size. Then, we use a cutting plane method to
iteratively add violated inequalities described in Section 2.3 in order to tighten the
base model. After we obtain the strong formulation (base model with additional
valid inequalities), our solution method applies a tailored LP-based heuristic to
generate good solutions to speed up the branch-and-bound procedure.
2.4.1 Preprocessing
Preprocessing can reduce the problem size, thereby obtaining the solution
more quickly. We preprocess problems by eliminating variables as follows.
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• Elimination of vehicle exit variables. Recall that τQJ denote the shortest
trip time among suppliers in Q and customers in J . Compute the available
cumulative vehicle delivery capacity (N ′t = N⌊t/τQJ⌋) and the cumulative
customer demand (D′t =
∑
TJ(j)⊆{1,...,t}Dj) by each period t. Identify the
period t̄ when the difference between the cumulative vehicle delivery capac-
ity and customer demand (N ′t−D
′
t)is the smallest. We can infer the earliest
period te that any vehicle can leave the system by checking . Before period
te, we eliminate all vehicle exit variables (s variables), thereby tightening
the models LP relaxation.
• Elimination of delivery variables. Compute the available cumulative vehicle
delivery capacity (N ′t = N⌊t/τQJ⌋) and the cumulative customer demand
(D′t =
∑
TJ(j)⊆{1,...,t}Dj) by each period t. Identify the period t̄ when the
difference between the cumulative vehicle delivery capacity and customer
demand (N ′t −D
′




t̄) = 0, we eliminate all delivery
variables (x, y, s variables) before period t̄.
2.4.2 Separation Strategies
The classes of inequalities all entail adding many additional constraints to
the model. The delivery consolidation inequality requires adding a constraint for
each combination of each customer with unit demand, supplier and time period;
the other two classes of inequalities require identifying the subsets of customers,
suppliers, and time intervals. So, adding all of the inequalities a priori to the
base model can vastly increase the problem size and computational time. Our
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cutting plane method starts with solving the LP relaxation of the base model,
and then iteratively adds the violated inequalities of each class separately to
strengthen the model. Specifically, set the violation tolerance range [ᾱ, α], and
applies the following procedures for residual capacity inequalities, cumulative
deliveries inequalities, and delivery consolidation inequalities respectively.
• Step 1. Set violation tolerance α = ᾱ .
• Step 2. Add the violated residual capacity inequalities for the violation
tolerance value α to the current formulation, and re-solves the LP relaxation
until no violated inequalities can be identified or the LP relaxation value
does not increase so much.
• Step 3. Set α = α/2 and repeat step 2 until α ≤ α.
The key step in the cutting plane algorithm is solving the separation prob-
lem to identify the violated inequalities of each class. For the class of delivery
consolidation inequality, we avoid checking each combination of customer with
unit demand, supplier and time period by adopting the separation strategy de-
scribed below in order to identify the violated inequality more efficiently. The
other two classes of inequalities require specifying customer subsets, a supplier
subset and time interval for each constraint. To find all the violated inequali-
ties or the most violated inequality is computationally intractable, so we develop
heuristic approaches to identify the subsets leading to constraints with large vi-
olations.
31
For a customer j with unit demand and supplier q ∈ Q(j), the incumbent
LP fractional solution might violate the Delivery Consolidation Inequality only
when the supplier serves the customer in consecutive periods. So, we check
whether the delivery consolidation inequality is violated at period t for customer
j and supplier q only if the LP relaxation solution of the base model has vehicle
flow from q to j in both period t and t− 1.
Since both classes of Cumulative Deliveries Inequality and Residual Ca-
pacity Inequality require selecting a subsystem consisting of a customer subset, a
supplier subset, and time interval for each constraint, we use the following com-
mon procedure to construct the subsystem. For each customer j∗, we construct a
subsystem consisting of customer subset J ′, supplier subset Q′, and time interval
with the largest violation by the incumbent LP solution. So, for each customer
j∗ ∈ J , we initialize the customer subset J ′ by including j∗.
• Step 1. Choose time intervals. For each customer j∗ ∈ J , identify the
delivery time interval, i.e., the earliest delivery period and latest delivery
period. Both inequalities are most likely effective for time intervals with
high delivery flow to the customer. So, we sort the periods in the decreasing
order of delivery flow, and extend the time interval [t1, t2] by including the
periods in the list one by one.
• Step 2. Construct subsystem. Construct the customer subset and supplier
subset for each time interval as follows.
– 2A. Include supplier q serving customer j∗ at t2 to Q
′.
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– 2B. For each period starting from t2 − 1 to t1, augment the customer
subset and supplier subset by following the principle that the aug-
mented subsets can make the LHS (the number of vehicles in the
subsystem) smaller.
– 2C. For other customers and suppliers, we add one by one to the
subsystem only if adding it would make the LHS smaller (the number
of vehicles in the subsystem).
For the cumulative deliveries inequality, for each customer j∗, we check
the violation value for each identified subsystem, and add the most violated
constraint to the model. The Residual Capacity Inequality requires selecting a
customer subset J ′′ to calculate the minimum number of vehicles K needed to
meet the customer demand (workload) in the time interval. Since the Residual
Capacity Inequality is effective only when K is more than ⌈z⌉ − 1 and less than
⌈z⌉, we augment the customer subset J ′′ from j∗ until the total customer de-
mand in J ′′ needs K(⌈z⌉− 1 < K < ⌈z⌉)vehicles to make deliveries. In addition,
to further limit the model size when adding the Residual Capacity Inequalities,
for each customer subset J ′′ , we choose the time interval with the largest vio-
lation. Given the incumbent fractional solution (x̄qjt, ȳjqt, r̄qt, s̄jt) , the detailed
separation procedure for the Residual Capacity Inequality is shown in Appendix
A.
33
2.4.3 LP-based Heuristic Procedure
The LP solution to the strong model serves as a good starting point for
generating heuristic solutions. We apply a LP-based approach to generate a
heuristic solution to reduce the enumeration effort in the branch-and-bound pro-
cedure. Based on the fractional solution to the strong model (base model with
added violated inequalities), we narrow the delivery window for each customer
and restrict the number of suppliers that can serve a customer. We obtain a
heuristic solution to the model with these additional constraints. More specifi-
cally, the LP based heuristic applies the following three steps from the fractional
solution (x̄qjt, ȳjqt, r̄qt, s̄jt) to the strong model.
• Step 1. Narrow customer delivery window. For each customer j, identify












x̄qjt = Dj; and add constraints specifying no
deliveries to the customer beyond the time window [t̄1, t̄2].
• Step 2. Restrict the number of suppliers that can serve a customer. For
each customer j, check if a candidate supplier q serves the customer in the






If supplier q does not serve customer j in the delivery window, impose the
restriction of no deliveries to the customer j from supplier q during the
entire horizon.
If the above LP-based heuristic cannot find a feasible solution, we change the
heuristic by relaxing the restriction on the starting delivery period of each cus-
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tomer in step 1. The result presented next demonstrates that our solution ap-
proach, combining model enhancements with the LP-based heuristic, is quite
effective.
2.5 Implementation and Impact
The goal of this essay is to formulate the ISDP as an integer program-
ming model, and develop valid inequalities and a LP-based heuristic to solve the
problem effectively. We apply this approach to three sets of actual data from an
actual company. Each data set has a limited number of available vehicles. Two
data sets have homogenous vehicles while the other data set has heterogeneous
vehicles. The suppliers have wide variation in price per ton and production ca-
pacities. Some suppliers are able to supply material for the entire horizon while
others can supply material only in some time interval. Also, some suppliers have
limits on the number of full loads per period, and total material availability
during the entire horizon. Each customer prefers suppliers within pre-specified
maximum distance from the customer site. If multiple suppliers meet distance
restriction, we select those that are the cheapest in terms of procurement cost
plus transportation cost, and if the cheapest suppliers have capacity restriction
or are not open all the year-round, we add other candidate suppliers. Empty
vehicles cannot travel more than pre-specified distance from customer site to the
next suppler. Based on these criteria, for each customer, we create the list of can-
didate suppliers who can supply materials, and the list of suppliers that vehicles
can go after unloading at the customer site.
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We implement the model in Java programs using ILOG CPLEX 10.0 Con-
cert Technology on a Linux server with 2 dualcore, hyperthreading 3.73 MHz
Xeon processors and 24 GB of shared memory. We eliminate 6% of the variables
through pre-processing. The problem size of base formulations for the available
sets of data varies from around 63,000 variables and 9,000 constraints to 102,000
variables and 12,000 constraints. Adding valid inequalities reduces the enumera-
tion effort for branch-and-bound and helps generate good heuristic solutions. To
assess the effectiveness of the strengthened model and solution methodology, we
apply a branch-and-bound procedure starting with the base model (base B&B
approach) and compare the performance versus starting with the strong model
and the heuristic solution (strong B&B approach). For both branch and-bound
procedures, we run for one hour or to achieve 1% gap and 24 hours or to achieve
1% gap respectively, and terminate the procedure whichever occurs earlier. We
assess the effectiveness of the strong model and associated heuristic by compar-
ing the final gaps ((Best UB - Best LB)/Best UB %), final upper bounds, and
computational times for the two approaches.
Table 2.1 summarizes the results using the base B&B and strong B&B
approaches. As shown from Rows 1 to 6 in the table, the cutting plane procedure
adds only a small number of cuts described in Section 2.3, around 10% of con-
straints, which limits the size of the strengthened model. The LP-based heuristic
based on the LP solution from the strengthened model provides near-optimal
solutions in short time without further applying branch-and-bound procedures.
In contrast, the base branch and bound procedure (Rows 7 to 12) cannot solve
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the problem optimally at the gap of 1% within one hour. Row 5 shows the sav-
ings of the strong B&B approach over the base B&B approach. To achieve 1%
gap, the base B&B approach needs much more time as shown in Row 6. The
results demonstrate effectiveness of our solution methodology, valid inequalities
with LP-based heuristic developed in Sections 2.3 and 2.4. Table 2.2 presents the
solution characteristics of the ISDP model. 75% to 93% of deliveries are supplied
by the cheapest suppliers (shown in Row 2), and 72% to 90% of deliveries are
supplied by the closest suppliers (shown in Row 4).
To assess the benefit of using ISDP model in practice, we compare the
solution obtained using a myopic heuristic with the optimal solution. The my-
opic heuristic starts with identifying the best supplier and the best customer to
serve for each vehicle by considering the supplier-customer cost. This cost in-
cludes the transportation and purchasing cost from a candidate supplier q to a
candidate customer j, the vehicle assignment cost at customer j, and an incen-
tive cost to induce an early delivery to customers with early due dates. For each
period and each vehicle, the heuristic procedure checks if the vehicle completes
the current forward trip in that period. When the forward trip is completed,
the procedure chooses the next best supplier-customer pair by considering the
above supplier customer cost plus the transportation cost from the current cus-
tomer location to the candidate supplier q. During the process of choosing the
best supplier-customer pair, the heuristic ensures the best candidate supplier has
enough capacity. This heuristic procedure considers the sourcing, vehicle assign-
ment, and routing decisions myopically instead of optimally. The ISDP model
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Table 2.1: Performance of model.
provides annual cost savings of more than 10% on average over the heuristic
(see Table 2.3). The company previously developed the material procurement
and delivery plan manually by choosing the closest suppliers. Sometimes, the
demand of customers could not be met by due date, resulting in the delay of
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Data set 1 Data set 2 Data set 3
1 No. of deliveries supplied by
cheapest suppliers
237 223 256
2 % of deliveries supplied by cheap-
est suppliers
75% 86% 93%
3 No. of deliveries supplied by clos-
est suppliers
226 219 247
4 % of deliveries supplied by closest
suppliers
72% 85% 90%
Table 2.2: Solution characteristic of ISDP model.
the following scheduled tasks. Taking this part of delay cost into account, the
ISDP model saves more cost. The results also show that the transportation cost
is around twice the procurement cost, the vehicle assignment cost is close to the
procurement cost for the data set having two types of vehicles, and the full-load
transportation cost is three times of the empty load transportation cost. There-
fore, heuristics focusing on only procurement cost, transportation cost, or vehicle
assignment cost, or even considering the total cost myopically, could result in high
cost, demonstrating the importance of considering sourcing, vehicle assignment,
and routing decisions simultaneously, i.e. the high value of ISDP model.
Data set 1 Data set 2 Data set 3
Savings of ISDP model over my-
opic heuristic
11.4% 18.7% 3.5%
Table 2.3: Comparison between solutions to ISDP model and myopic
heuristics.
Earlier discussion indicates that sequentially solving the sourcing and de-
livery problem can lead to an infeasible schedule, which is demonstrated in our
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computational test. We relax the ISDP model by excluding flow conservation con-
straints (2.5) and (2.6). The relaxed model provides an optimal solution to the
sourcing problem with suppliers capacity constraints. From the optimal solution,
we fix the suppliers customers assignment and then solve the delivery problem.
For two sets of data, the sequential approach gives feasible solutions, while for
the other data set, the sequential approach leads to an infeasible schedule. The
infeasibility results from the suppliers delivery closing period and/or opening pe-
riod with the customers due dates, requiring deliveries of more than the number
of available vehicles in a single period. This result further demonstrates the
importance of considering the integrated sourcing and delivery planning model.
In addition, planners benefit strategically by examining whether they have
sufficient suppliers or the adequate number of vehicles to transport materials.
If the company does not have enough vehicles to transport material to all the
customers by the due dates, they can either purchase or rent more vehicles in
advance. The suppliers know how much the customers require in each period
and over the horizon. Moreover, our model can perform what-if analysis. For
instance, if we have one fewer vehicle, we can know whether the due dates for
customers can be met and how much the total cost is. With one more vehicle,
how much can we save on the total cost? The planners can check if they can
rent a vehicle with expenses less than the savings. The model provides another
opportunity for cost savings. Furthermore, as contingences or new requirements
arise, the ISDP model can easily provide the updated optimal schedule.
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2.6 Conclusion
In this essay, we address the ISDP motivated by the material supply plan-
ning task for scheduled construction projects at an actual company that we
worked with. The ISDP entails sourcing, vehicle assignment, and routing de-
cisions to minimize total procurement, transportation, and vehicle assignment
cost. Based on the characteristics of the problem, we formulated the ISDP as a
large-scale integer programming model. The ISDP is computationally intractable,
so we developed an effective solution methodology to obtain the near-optimal
sourcing and delivery schedule within short time. The solution method includes
preprocessing the problem to eliminate the number of variables to reduce the
problem size, developing a cutting plane procedure to iteratively separating and
adding violated valid inequalities to strengthen the models LP relaxation and
reduce the computational efforts for branch-and-bound procedures, applying a
LP-based heuristic to generate a good solution to speed up the branch and bound
procedure. The application of our approach to three actual sourcing and delivery
planning problems demonstrates the effectiveness of our solution methodology.
Moreover, the ISDP model provides annual cost savings of over 10% on av-
erage compared to a myopic heuristic. With the expensive construction projects,
the savings are substantial. The results demonstrate the high value of the ISDP
model minimizing the procurement cost, transportation cost, and vehicle assign-
ment cost simultaneously. Furthermore, the ISDP optimization model is a valu-
able decision support tool for tactical planning. The model provides a compre-
hensive framework for decision-making by clarifying objectives and costs, and
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ensuring consideration of all factors such as capacities and timing constraints.
From the obtained solution, we can have an overview of material production and
transportation needs, sourcing patterns during the planning horizon, vehicle de-
ployment, and delivery schedules. In addition, using the model, we are able to
know beforehand if we have sufficient suppliers for the customers and the ade-
quate number of vehicles to make deliveries on time. The model also provides
useful what-if capabilities to analyze the impact or reducing the number of sup-
pliers, vehicles, and so on. With the increasing transportation costs and trends
toward more outsourcing, the ISDP model has wide applications in industry.
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Chapter 3
Assortment Planning for Vertically
Differentiated Products
3.1 Introduction
When choosing what products to carry in a given product category, retail-
ers typically have to choose from hundreds, possibly thousands of variants, offered
by dozens of different manufacturers. For instance, Newegg (www.newegg.com)
carries more than 400 different USB flash drives and 1400 different televisions
but these only represent a fraction of the existing products in the market as the
retailer does not offer every brand and model. Selecting products to offer is a
challenging problem for retailers, because customer choice depends on customer
preferences as well as on the available assortment, and profit depends on sales and
the relative profitability of products. A naive way to obtain the profit-maximizing
assortment would be to enumerate all possible combinations of products and sell-
ing prices and identify the most profitable one. However, this method is not
practical for popular product categories such as televisions and computers for
which the number of possible products to choose from is very large. Hence,
developing efficient methods to obtain a profit-maximizing assortment is very
important and valuable for retailers.
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This essay addresses the problem of a retailer managing a category of
vertically differentiated products. Each product is characterized by a quality
level. If the product has many vertical attributes, we assume that these attributes
can be collapsed into a single quality dimension. All else equal, customers prefer
a product with a higher quality level to a product with a lower quality level,
but they differ in how they value quality. We assume that customers determine
what product to buy by maximizing a linear utility function which is increasing in
quality and their valuation of quality and is decreasing in price. While the retailer
does not know how a specific customer values a unit of quality, she knows the
distribution of customer valuations. The retailer buys the products from one or
multiple manufacturers so that the quality levels of the products are exogenously
determined. The retailer pays the manufacturer(s) a variable cost per product
sold and incurs a fixed cost per product included in the assortment.
First, we examine the scenario where selling prices are exogenous to the
retailer and her only decision is to choose the set of products to be included in
the assortment. This setting is motivated by product categories for which the
manufacturers’ suggested retail prices (MSRP) are so prevalent that retailers do
not deviate from it. Carlton & Chevalier (2001) state that while “manufacturers
may not contractually bind the retailer to charge the MSRP [...] (they) may
be willing to supply ‘exclusive’ products to retailers who adopt an across-the-
board ‘no discounting’ policy”. The data they collect about the fragrance market
show that a number of stores (namely upscale beauty and department stores) are
charging the MSRP for the products they sell. We show that, when prices are
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exogenous to the retailer, the optimal set is a function of the distribution of
customer valuations for quality and can be obtained by solving a shortest path
problem.
Second, we consider the case where the retailer also decides the selling
price of the products offered in her assortment, i.e., selling prices are endogenous
variables. We show that the optimal assortment does not depend on the dis-
tribution of customer valuations for quality, as long as this distribution has an
increasing failure rate and the fixed cost is negligible. We propose a number of
algorithms to obtain the optimal assortment. The complexity of these algorithms
depends on the value of the fixed cost and on properties of the distribution of
customer valuations for quality.
Third, we compare the optimal assortment in the two cases studied and
obtain some interesting insights. In particular, we show that the optimal as-
sortment may contain dominated products when prices are exogenous, but not
when prices are endogenous. We say that a product is dominated if there exists
a product with a higher quality level, lower variable cost, and (in the exogenous
case only) higher selling price in the set of potential products to offer. We also
demonstrate that the products included in the optimal assortment are such that
the selling prices, profit margins and price-to-quality ratios are increasing in the
quality level. Finally, we show that if some of the offered products become un-
available, it may be optimal for the retailer to include products which previously
were not in the optimal assortment. However, it is never optimal to drop products
which were offered and are still available.
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An example of application for our model is that of a retailer selling USB
flash drives from multiple manufacturers (such as Kingston, SanDisk, HP, etc.).
These drives differ mainly in memory size (2Gb, 4Gb, 8Gb, etc.) and, at equal
prices, customers prefer a drive with higher memory size to a drive with a lower
memory size. Memory sizes (i.e., quality levels) are determined by the manufac-
turers. Each manufacturer may provide an MSRP for each variant to the retailer.
Depending on her market power, the retailer may or may not be able or willing
to deviate from this price. If she does not deviate, then our results from Section
3.3 apply. If the retailer determines the selling prices, our results from Section
3.4 apply.
It is important to note that the exogenous price problem is not a special
case of the endogenous price problem and vice versa. First order conditions can
be used to solve for prices in the endogenous prices case, but the resulting prices
may be a function of the chosen assortment so that it is generally not possible
to decouple the optimal prices and optimal assortment problems. As shown
later, when prices are decision variables, we are able to establish more properties
about the optimal assortment and develop more efficient algorithms to identify
the optimal assortment.
The paper that is most closely related to ours is that of Barghava &
Choudhary (2001) who also consider the problem of selecting and pricing ver-
tically differentiated products when quality levels are exogenously determined.
However, our work differs from theirs in numerous ways. First, we consider a
fixed cost and show that it is an important factor in determining the optimal
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assortment. Second, we consider the case of exogenous selling prices. Third,
we provide a full characterization of the optimal assortment when prices are en-
dogenous. In contrast, Barghava & Choudhary (2001) only provide a partial
characterization of the optimal assortment when there is no fixed cost. They
focus only on two special cases: when the optimal assortment contains only the
highest quality product and when it contains all the products. In other words,
while their work addresses the question “when does the optimal solution have a
noteworthy structure?”, our work answers the more general question “how can we
obtain the optimal solution for any given scenario and what are its properties?”.
The rest of this essay is organized as follows. In Section 3.2 we review
the related literature. In Section 3.3 we present the exogenous prices model and
develop an efficient algorithm to identify the optimal assortment. Section 3.4
contains the endogenous prices model and the corresponding results. In Section
3.5 we compare the two models and discuss interesting insights. Section 3.6
concludes our work and provides directions for future research. All proofs are
presented in the Appendix.
3.2 Literature Review
Besides Barghava & Choudhary (2001), our work is at the intersection
between two streams of research: the work on vertically differentiated products
and the work on assortment planning. We first review the work on vertically
differentiated products, and then discuss the relevant papers on assortment plan-
ning.
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Mussa & Rosen (1978) is, to our knowledge, the earliest work on vertical
differentiated products. In this paper, the authors capture the heterogeneity of
customers using a continuous valuation parameter θ. The utility that a customer
with valuation θ gets from a product of quality q is θq, i.e., the utility function
is linear. Assuming convex production cost, the authors show that price dis-
crimination by offering products of different quality levels is optimal. Moorthy
(1984) generalizes the utility and cost functions and uses discrete parameters to
represent customer segments. He concludes that the firm may reduce the number
of product versions offered in order to mitigate the cannibalization effect. Sev-
eral other researchers, such as Green & Krieger (1985), and Dobson & Kalish
(1988, 1993), use a limited number of customer segments to represent the mar-
ket. The information about the number of customers and reservation price for
products associated with each segment is assumed to be known. They formu-
late the problem as a mathematical programming model and develop heuristics
to solve it. Assuming concave variable costs and considering a fixed setup cost
for producing a batch of products, Netessine & Taylor (2007) examine how pro-
duction technology impacts the optimal product line design. They demonstrate
that cannibalization may lead to offering more products and higher quality in the
presence of production technology.
The papers mentioned above take the point of view of a manufacturer
as it is assumed that the decision maker can pick any quality level for their
products and possibly provide a continuous menu of quality-price combinations.
In contrast, our work takes the point of view of a retailer and assumes that there
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is only a discrete set of quality levels to choose from. Like these papers, our work
adopts the linear utility function but we do not make any assumption about
the cost function and make only limited assumptions about the distribution of
customer valuations in endogenous prices case.
Several other papers which study product differentiation problems incor-
porate issues we do not explore here, such as the presence of outside opportunities,
see Chen & Seshadri (2007), network effects on the versioning strategies; see for
example Barghava & Choudhary (2004) and Jing (2007), and the optimal time
to introduce product versions, i.e., either simultaneously or sequentially; see for
example Moorthy & PNG (1992) and Raghunathan (2000). Finally, a number
of papers consider the problem of offering vertically differentiated products in a
competitive setting; see for example Shaked & Sutton (1982), Moorthy (1988),
Shugan (1989), Rhee (1996), and Jing (2006).
In assortment planning problems, a firm chooses what products to offer
from a discrete set of potential products and customers have heterogenous prefer-
ences for these products. The papers usually differ in the consumer choice model
that is used to represent customer preferences and the type of substitution they
assume. Most papers assume that products are horizontally rather than verti-
cally differentiated, which means that two customers can have a different favorite
product even if all products are offered at the same price. Since our work does
not include the presence of inventory, it is most closely related to the work on
assortment planning that assumes static, assortment-based substitution. So we
will focus on these papers. For a broader review of the topic (including papers
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that assume dynamic, stock-out based substitution), see Kok et al. (2008).
Among the earliest papers on assortment planning, Pentico (1974) studies
a one-dimensional assortment planning problem with downward substitution for
stochastic demand and obtains the optimal solution with an assumption regarding
the sequence of customer arrivals and a ‘no crossover’ assumption, which preclude
dynamic substitution. Van Ryzin & Mahajan (1999) use the multinomial logit
model to represent customer preferences for horizontally differentiated products
and show that the optimal assortment includes a subset of the most popular
products. Gaur & Honhon (2006) consider the same problem but use a locational
choice model to represent customer preferences. They introduce a unimodal
distribution of customers on the attribute space, and show that the products
in the optimal assortment are equally spaced and need not include the most
popular product. Smith & Agrawal (2000) consider this problem under stock-out
based substitution but provide a solution method which assumes assortment-
based substitution and use a choice model specified by first choice probabilities
and a substitution matrix. Cachon et al. (2005) generalize the consumer choice
process to incorporate search costs, and show that ignoring consumer search
in demand estimation can result in an assortment with less variety and lower
expected profit than the optimal solution.
The papers mentioned so far all assume that prices are given. The follow-
ing papers consider prices as decision variables. Hopp & Xu (2005) use a Bayesian
Logit model to study the impact of modular design on the joint assortment plan-
ning and pricing problem under assortment-based substitution. They show that
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the optimal assortment for a risk-averse retailer is composed of the variants with
the highest price markups. Maddah & Bish (2007) consider a similar setting and
propose a dominance relationship for the general case that simplifies the search
for an optimal assortment. Aydin & Porteus (2008) study the joint assortment
and pricing problem under price-based substitution with a demand model involv-
ing multiplicative uncertainty. Alptekinoglu & Corbett (2008) use the locational
choice model to study competitive product positioning and pricing.
To the best of our knowledge, our work is the first paper that considers
the problem of selecting products from a discrete set of vertically differentiated
options when prices are fixed and the problem of selecting and pricing vertically
differentiated products in the presence of a fixed cost, when prices are decision
variables.
3.3 The Exogenous Prices Case
As mentioned in the Introduction, this setting applies, for example, when
the retailer is not able to or not willing to deviate from the MSRP and hence, the
selling prices are exogenous to the retailer. In this section, we present the model,
analyze the optimal assortment structure, and develop an efficient algorithm to
identify the optimal solution.
3.3.1 Model
We consider a product category with n vertically differentiated products.
Let qj denote the quality of product j. The quality level can also be regarded
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as a combination of many of the product’s characteristics if the product has
many characteristics, which is a common assumption in the literature on vertical
differentiated products. Without loss of generality we assume that 0 ≤ q1 < q2 <
... < qn.
1 Let rj ≥ 0 and cj ≥ 0 be the selling price, variable cost of product
j respectively. Note that we do not assume that cj ≥ cj−1. Let K ≥ 0 be a
fixed cost incurred for each product that is offered. In practice K includes, for
example, the cost of advertising the product. For notational convenience, let 0 be
a fictitious product 0 with q0 = c0 = r0 = 0. Let ~r = (r1, ..., rn), ~c = (c1, ..., cn),
and ~q = (q1, ..., qn).
We assume that customers are characterized by their willingness to pay
for one unit of quality in the product category, or valuation. A customer with
valuation θ gets utility θqj − rj from buying one unit of product j and zero for
additional units. Without loss of generality, we assume that the utility of buying
nothing is equal to zero. A customer buys the product which gives him the highest
utility as long as it is positive. The retailer cannot identify the specific θ value for
any customer, but knows the distribution of θ. Let f(θ) and F (θ) with support
[θ, θ̄] denote the probability density function and cumulative density function of
customer valuations respectively, where θ ≥ 0 and 0 < θ̄ ≤ ∞.
In the exogenous prices model, ~r, ~q and ~c are given and fixed. It is assumed
that cj < rj < qj for j = 1, ..., n; otherwise, it would be optimal not to stock
product j for sure. Note that we do not exclude the possibility that two products
1All of our results would continue to hold if we had qj = qj+1 for some j but, for ease of
exposition, we ignore this case.
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i, j are such that ri < rj and qi > qj (better quality for a lower price). The
retailer’s decision is to determine which products to offer. Let S denote the set
of products that are offered, or assortment. We summarize our notation in Table
3.1.
Symbol Definition
n Number of potential products in the category
j Product index, j = 1, ..., n
qj Quality level of product j
cj Variable cost of product j
rj Selling price of product j
~q Quality vector
~c Variable cost vector
~r Selling price vector
θ Consumer valuation, ∈ [θ, θ̄]
f(θ) Probability density function of consumer valuation
F (θ) Cumulative distribution function of consumer valuation
h(θ) Failure rate of distribution F (θ)
η(θ) Inverse failure rate
θj Valuation of consumer who is indifferent between products j − 1 and j
Pj Purchase probability of product j
S Assortment, i.e., set of products offered
S∗ Optimal assortment
K Fixed cost incurred for each product included in the assortment
EΠ Retailer’s expected profit
EΠ∗ Retailer’s optimal expected profit
Table 3.1: Notation
Let Pj(S) be the proportion of customers who purchase product j given





I{qjθ − rj = maxi∈S(qiθ − ri) and qjθ − rj > 0}dF (θ) if j ∈ S
0 otherwise
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where I{A} is the indicator function for event A.
In theory, it is possible to have Pj(S) = 0 for j ∈ S, that is, product j is
offered but no customer buys it. In this case, removing product j does not affect
the demand for other products and it decreases the total fixed cost; therefore,
the optimal assortment never includes a product with zero purchase probability.
It follows that one can restrict the search for the optimal assortment to sets






















for i = 1, ..., m− 1, (3.2)






where j0 = 0. Figure 3.1 illustrates an example with three products. Consumers
in Group A are such that θ ≤ θ ≤ r1
q1
and purchase nothing since they get a non-





and purchase product 1 because it gives them the highest utility. Consumers
in Group C are such that r2−r1
q2−q1
< θ ≤ r3−r2
q3−q2
and buy product 2 although each
product gives them a positive utility. Finally, consumers in group D are such
that r3−r2
q3−q2



























for product 1, 2 and 3.
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Product 1 Product 2 Product 3
Figure 3.1: Purchase probabilities in an example with 3 products.
Without loss of generality we normalize mean demand to 1.2 The expected




Pj(S)(rj − cj) −K|S|, (3.4)
where |S| denotes the size of set S. The firm’s objective is to find S∗ such that




To solve the retailer’s profit maximization problem (3.5), we can enumer-
ate all possible assortments S, compute their expected profit, and identify the
optimal assortment with the highest expected profit. However, the complexity of
2If mean demand is µ > 1, then K is set to equal to the fixed cost of stocking a product
divided by µ.
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this naive enumeration method is O(2n), which is not practical when n is large.
Consequently, we develop an efficient algorithm to obtain the optimal
assortment. This algorithm is based on some important properties of the optimal
assortment which we present first. Let S∗ = {j1, j2, ..., jm} be the optimal set
such that j1 < j2 < ... < jm.
Lemma 3.3.1. The products in an optimal assortment S∗ satisfy the following
three conditions:











rj1 − cj1 ≤ rj2 − cj2 ≤ ... ≤ rjm − cjm . (3.8)
Lemma 3.3.1 indicates that, in the optimal assortment, the product prices
and price-quality ratios are strictly increasing in the quality level and the profit
margins are non-decreasing in the quality levels. The first two conditions are
necessary for all products in S∗ to get a positive purchase probability. To prove
the third property we show that, if a product j has a lower profit margin than
products of lower quality, then the retailer can get a higher expected profit by
removing product j.
From (3.2), (3.3) and (3.4), notice that the contribution of product ji to
the expected profit in assortment S depends only on the adjacent products ji−1
and ji+1, since products before ji−1 and after ji+1 have no impact on the purchase
probability of product ji. As a consequence, we are able to model this problem
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as a shortest path problem and solve it in polynomial time. Moreover, we use
the properties of Lemma 3.3.1 to construct a parsimonious network.
We construct a graph G = (V,A), where V is the set of nodes and A is
the arc set of G. Node set V consists of pairs of products (i, j) such that product
j has a higher quality and price-quality ratio than product i and a profit margin
which is is no lower than that of product i. A node (i, j) ∈ V indicates that
products i and j could be offered together in the assortment. We also introduce
two fictitious nodes: a source node (0, 0) and a destination node (n + 1, n + 1).






< θ̄, then the arc between these
two nodes is a valid arc, which belongs to A. A valid arc between (i, j) and (j, k)
implies that product j could be offered along with products i and k. We are able
to compute the cost of the arc between (i, j) and (j, k) using the prices, variable
costs, and quality levels of these three products. We find the optimal assortment
by solving the shortest path problem from the source node to the destination
node. We formalize the procedure as follows.
ALGORITHM: Shortest Path ‘Exo’
• Step 1. Construct the node set V , which consists of the following nodes:
V =
{





∪ {(j, n+ 1) : 1 ≤ j ≤ n}
∪ {(0, 0), (n+ 1, n+ 1)}
∪
{






< θ̄ and ri − ci ≤ rj − cj
}
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• Step 2. Construct the arc set by adding an arc from node (i, j) ∈ V to







< θ̄ if k < n + 1
θ ≤ rj−ri
qj−qi
< θ̄ if k = n + 1




















if 0 < j < k < n+ 1







if 0 < j < k = n+ 1
0 otherwise
• Step 4. Solve the shortest path problem from (0, 0) to (n+ 1, n+ 1).
Theorem 3.3.1. The Shortest Path ‘Exo’ algorithm gives an optimal assortment.
Note that it is necessary to define the nodes as pairs of products as one
needs to know which product is to the left and which product is to the right of a
given product in order to compute its contribution to the expected profit. Also,
note that our result does not make any assumption on the distribution of cus-
tomer valuation F . In the context of a firm determining the optimal tradeoff be-
tween variety and leadtime for horizontally differentiated products, Alptekinoglu
& Corbett (2009) also use a shortest path formulation to solve for the optimal
product line.
Corollary 3.3.2. The complexity of the Shortest Path ‘Exo’ algorithm is O(n3).
The efficiency of the Shortest Path ‘Exo’ algorithm makes our method to
identify the optimal assortment attractive. We use an example in next section to
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illustrate how to use the algorithm.
3.3.3 Example and Properties of the Optimal Solution
The shortest path ‘Exo’ algorithm is most useful when the retailer faces a
large number of candidate products, but the small example below illustrates the
underlying mechanism and provides valuable insights.
Example 3.1. A retailer can choose from three vertically differentiated products
with ~c = (5, 4.5, 50), ~q = (30, 36, 100) and ~r = (15, 15.5, 80). She knows that the
distribution of customer valuations follows distribution F (θ) = 1−(1−θ)b, where
b > 0 with support [0, 1]. She needs to decide what products to offer in order to
maximize the profit.
The distribution of customer valuations F (θ) = 1 − (1 − θ)b is a common
distribution to model consumer preferences; see, for example, Debo et al. (2005)
and Sundararajan (2004). It corresponds to a beta distribution3 with parameter
a = 1 and b > 0. Note that the uniform distribution on [0, 1] is a special case
of this distribution obtained by setting b = 1. If b > 1, then the distribution
function is concave, meaning that there are more customers with low valuations.
If 0 < b < 1, then the distribution function is convex, meaning that there are
more customers with high valuations.
Using the enumeration method, one would need to consider seven assort-
3The probability density function is B(θ; a, b) = θ
a−1(1−θ)b−1






ments: {1}, {2}, {3}, {1, 2}, {1, 3}, {2, 3}, and {1, 2, 3} and compute the expected
profit for each one. Figure 3.2 shows the graph. (0,0) and (4,4) are the source





















Figure 3.2: Graph for Example 3.1 with K = 0 and b = 1.
Table 3.2 shows the correspondence between the valid path and assort-
ment. The network contains four valid paths which correspond to the following
assortments: {1}, {2}, {3}, and {1, 3}. Therefore, compared to the enumeration
method, we are able to exclude three assortments.
Valid path Assortment
(0, 0) → (0, 1) → (1, 3) → (3, 4) → (4, 4) {1, 3}
(0, 0) → (0, 1) → (1, 4) → (4, 4) {1}
(0, 0) → (0, 2) → (2, 4) → (4, 4) {2}
(0, 0) → (0, 3) → (3, 4) → (4, 4) {3}
Table 3.2: Mapping between path and assortment for Example 3.1.
In Figure 3.2, the arc costs are computed using K = 0 and b = 1. In
this case, applying the Shortest Path ‘Exo’ algorithm gives the optimal path
(0, 0) → (0, 1) → (1, 3) → (3, 4) → (4, 4), which corresponds to the assortment
{1, 3}, and gives an optimal expected profit of $6.43.
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We now compare the optimal assortments for different values of the fixed
cost, i.e., K = 0 or 0.5, and different distributions of customer valuations, i.e.,
b = 1/2, 1 or 2. Table 3.3 shows the optimal assortment S∗ for each possible
combination of K and b. We see that the optimal assortment varies with the
customer valuation distribution F since it varies with b (we will show that this
result is not true when K = 0 in the endogenous prices case). In particular,
when b = 1/2, many customers have a high valuation of quality and it is optimal
to offer only product 3, which is the most profitable product. When b = 1, the
distribution of quality valuation is uniform and it is optimal to add product 1 to
the assortment in order to increase total demand, even though it also leads to
some customers switching from product 3 to the less profitable product 1. Finally
when b = 2 and most customers have low valuations of quality and it is most
important to capture the greatest possible market, so the optimal assortment is
to offer only product 2, which has the lowest price-to-quality ratio.
When b = 1, we see that, as the fixed cost changes fromK = 0 to K = 0.5,
the optimal assortment changes from {1, 3} to {2}. Therefore, retailers need to
be aware of any change in the fixed cost as it can have a great impact on the
optimal assortment.
As expected, the expected profit decreases with b since a decrease in b
implies that more customers have high valuation for quality.
Another interesting observation is with regard to the relative attractive-
ness of the products the optimal assortment. We say that product i dominates






and that a product is dominated
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b = 1/2 b = 1 b = 2
K = 0 S∗ = {3} S∗ = {1, 3} S∗ = {2}
EΠ∗ = 13.41 EΠ∗ = 6.43 EΠ∗ = 3.57
K = 0.5 S∗ = {3} S∗ = {2} S∗ = {2}
EΠ∗ = 12.91 EΠ∗ = 5.74 EΠ∗ = 3.07
Table 3.3: Optimal assortments and optimal expected profit values as a
function of K and b in Example 3.1.
if there exists at least one product in {1, ..., n} that dominates it. In Example
3.1, product 1 is dominated by product 2 and yet product 1 is included in the
optimal solution when b = 1 and K = 0. It follows that one cannot eliminate
dominated products as they might be included in the optimal assortment (in the
next section we show that this property does not hold in the endogenous prices
case).
3.4 The Endogenous Prices Case
This section presents the model when prices are endogenous. We discuss
the optimal solution structure and develop several efficient algorithms to identify
the optimal assortment. The choice of which algorithm to use depends on the
value of the fixed cost and the nature of the distribution of customer valuations.
3.4.1 Model
In the endogenous prices model, only ~q and ~c are given and fixed. The
retailer needs to determine the assortment S and the selling price rj for product
j ∈ S. Note that it is possible to set the selling price of a product so high
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than no customers buys it, that is, such that the product has a zero purchase
probability. In this case, the product should not be included in the assortment
due to the fixed cost. Therefore we regard ~r as the only decision variable in
this problem and define the corresponding assortment as the set of the products
with positive purchasing probability given ~r. As in the exogenous model, each
customer observes ~r and ~q then chooses the product that gives him the highest
utility as long as it is positive.
Let h(θ) = f(θ)
1−F (θ)
be the failure (or hazard) rate of distribution F , and
η(θ) = 1
h(θ)
be the inverse failure (or hazard) rate. F is an increasing failure rate
(IFR) distribution if h′(θ) ≥ 0 or equivalently η′(θ) ≤ 0 for all θ. In this section,
we assume that F is an IFR distribution. This assumption is satisfied by most
common distributions, e.g., uniform, normal, logistic, chi-squared, exponential,
Laplace, and beta distributions with a = 1. Note that this assumption is not




for j = 1, ..., n. A customer with valuation θj gets the
same utility from products j − 1 and j. Without loss of generality, we assume
that the prices are set such that
θ ≤ θ1 ≤ ... ≤ θn ≤ θ̄. (3.9)
because for any set of prices that does not satisfy this condition, there exists a
set of prices that does, with the same purchase probability for each product and
the same total expected profit.
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Let Pj(~r) be the purchase probability for product j. We have:
Pj(~r) = F (θj+1) − F (θj),
Pn(~r) = 1 − F (θn).
Let S(~r) denote the assortment, that is, the set of products with Pj(~r) > 0
given price vector ~r. Given (θ1, ..., θn) satisfying (4.1), we have S(~r) = {j =





Pj(~r)(rj − cj) −K|S(~r)|.
The firm’s objective is to find ~r∗ such that
EΠ∗ = EΠ(~r∗) = max
~r
EΠ(~r).
We use S∗ = S(~r∗) to denote the optimal assortment.
Note that there is a one-to-one correspondence between ~r and ~θ = (θ1, ..., θn).
Let ~θ be the vector corresponding to ~r, and S(~θ) be the assortment corresponding






[1 − F (θj)] [θj(qj − qj−1) − (cj − cj−1)] −K|S(~θ)|.
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The retailer’s profit maximization problem is
max~θ EΠ(
~θ)
s.t. θ ≤ θ1 ≤ θ2 ≤ ... ≤ θn ≤ θ̄
(3.10)
3.4.2 Results
In Section 3.3.2, we observe that, when prices are exogenous, the prod-
ucts in the optimal assortment have some nice properties regarding prices and
price-quality ratios. Those properties enable us to develop an efficient algo-
rithm to identify the optimal set of products to offer. Similarly, when prices
are decision variables, we obtain properties of the optimal assortment then use
them to develop efficient solution methods. Let S∗ = {j1, ..., jm}, such that
j1 < j2 < ... < jm be an optimal assortment of products with positive purchase
probability.




















cj1 < cj2 < ... < cjm. (3.13)
Lemma 3.4.1 shows that both the variable costs and cost-quality ratios of
products in the optimal assortment are strictly increasing in the quality levels.
These conditions allow the retailer to price the products so that she can extract
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maximum surplus from consumers.
Lemma 3.4.2 provides a method to compute the optimal prices r∗, once
S∗ is known.







for i = 1, ..., m. (3.14)
where j0 = 0. For k /∈ S
∗, we have θ∗k = θ
∗
k+1 if k < jm and θ
∗
k = θ̄ if k > jm. The





θ∗jx(qjx − qjx−1), for i = 1, ..., m. (3.15)
Note that products which are not in S∗ are not offered and therefore
Lemma 3.4.2 does not provide a selling price for them. Using these optimal
prices, we establish some properties of the optimal assortment.




j2 < ... < r
∗
jm , (3.16)
r∗j1 − cj1 < r
∗
j2 − cj2 < ... < r
∗
jm − cjm. (3.17)
Corollary 3.4.3 reveals that, in an optimal assortment, both product prices
and profit margins are strictly increasing in the quality levels. Intuitively, if the
profit margin of a product is less than another product with lower quality, the
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retailer can improve the profit by either changing the product price or removing
the product.
In the exogenous prices case, we notice that the optimal assortment may
include dominated products and therefore these products cannot be deleted before
using the Shortest Path ‘Exo’ algorithm. We now examine if the same result
holds when prices are endogenous. Because prices are no longer fixed, we have
to modify the definition of dominated products slightly and say that product i
dominates product j if ci < cj, qi > qj, and a product is dominated if there
exists at least one product that dominates it. The following result shows that
dominated products are never included in the optimal assortment.
Lemma 3.4.4. An optimal assortment S∗ does not contain any dominated prod-
uct.
This result is particularly useful if the number of products n is very large,
since one can eliminate dominated products before using the algorithm below.
Identifying dominated products can be done in O(n2).
In a different context, Deneckere & McAfee (1996) show that, under some
conditions, it is profitable to introduce a product with a lower quality and higher
variable cost than an existing product. However, they note in Lemma 3 on page
168, that this result does not hold when the ratio of how a customer values
the product with low quality to how he values the product with high quality is




if ql and qh are
the value of low quality and high quality respectively, which is nondecreasing in
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θ. Therefore, their result does not apply to our setting.
Using the properties from Lemma 3.4.1, we develop a method to find the
optimal solution in polynomial time by modeling the problem of finding S∗ as a
shortest path problem.
ALGORITHM: Shortest Path ‘Endo’
• Step 1. Construct node set V , which consists of the following nodes:
V =
{









∪ {(0, 0), (n+ 1, n+ 1)} ∪
{









• Step 2. Construct arc set by adding an arc from node (i, j) ∈ V to (l, k) ∈ V






< θ̄ if k < n+ 1
cj−ci
qj−qi
< θ̄ if k = n+ 1 and l < k
• Step 3. Compute the arc costs:
C(i,j),(j,k) =
{
K − [θk(qk − qj) − (ck − cj)] [1 − F (θk)] if k < n + 1
0 if k = n + 1




• Step 4. Solve the shortest path problem from (0, 0) to (n+ 1, n+ 1).
Theorem 3.4.1. Shortest Path ‘Endo’ Algorithm gives an optimal assortment.
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Corollary 3.4.5. The complexity of the Shortest Path ‘Endo’ algorithm is O(n3).
Once S∗ is obtained by solving Shortest Path ‘Endo’ Algorithm, we can
use Lemma 3.4.2 to obtain the optimal prices. Note that the Shortest Path
‘Endo’ Algorithm has the same complexity as the Shortest Path ‘Exo’ Algorithm
of Section 3.3. However, in practice, the number of nodes and arcs is generally
greater in the endogenous case since there are fewer conditions on the node set,
and, as a result, solving the Shortest Path ‘Endo’ Algorithm generally takes longer
than solving the Shortest Path ‘Exo’ Algorithm.
3.4.3 Example, Properties of the Optimal Solution and Special Cases
To illustrate how the Shortest Path ‘Endo’ Algorithm works, we show how
to obtain the optimal assortment using the same data as in Example 3.1.
Example 3.2. (Cont’d from Example 3.1) Let ~c, ~q and the customer valuation
distribution F be as in Example 3.1. The retailer needs to decide what products
to offer and how to price the offered products.
In this case, the network, shown in Figure 3.3, contains ten nodes and
five valid paths. Table 3.4 maps the valid paths to assortments {1}, {2}, {3},
{1, 3},and {2, 3}, so that there is one more valid path than in the exogenous case.
Compared to the enumeration method, we are able to exclude two assortments.
In Figure 3.3, the arc costs are computed using K = 0 and b = 1. In
























Figure 3.3: Graph for Example 3.2 with K = 0 and b = 1.
Valid path Assortment
(0, 0) → (0, 1) → (1, 3) → (3, 4) → (4, 4) {1, 3}
(0, 0) → (0, 2) → (2, 3) → (3, 4) → (4, 4) {2, 3}
(0, 0) → (0, 1) → (1, 4) → (4, 4) {1}
(0, 0) → (0, 2) → (2, 4) → (4, 4) {2}
(0, 0) → (0, 3) → (3, 4) → (4, 4) {3}
Table 3.4: Mapping between paths and assortments in Example 3.2.
(0, 0) → (0, 2) → (2, 3) → (3, 4) → (4, 4) which corresponds to the assortment
{2, 3} and gives an optimal expected profit of $8.23.
As in exogenous prices case, we now compare the optimal assortments for
different values of the fixed cost, i.e., K = 0 or 0.5 and different distributions of
customer valuations, i.e., b = 1/2, 1 or 2. Table 3.5 shows the optimal assortment
S∗ for each possible combination of K and b.
As expected, we see that expected profit is decreasing in K and b. Notice
that the optimal assortment varies with b when K > 0, but not when K = 0.
Lemma 3.4.6 shows that this result for K = 0 is true in general.
Lemma 3.4.6. If K = 0, S∗ is optimal if and only if the conditions from Lemma
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b = 1/2 b = 1 b = 2
S∗ = {2, 3} S∗ = {2, 3} S∗ = {2, 3}
K = 0 r∗2 = 20.25, r
∗
3 = 75 r
∗
2 = 20.25, r
∗
3 = 75 r
∗
2 = 20.25, r
∗
3 = 75
EΠ∗ = 13.93 EΠ∗ = 8.23 EΠ∗ = 3.21
S∗ = {2, 3} S∗ = {2, 3} S∗ = {2}
K = 0.5 r∗2 = 20.25, r
∗
3 = 75 r
∗
2 = 20.25, r
∗
3 = 75 r
∗
2 = 20.25
EΠ∗ = 12.93 EΠ∗ = 7.23 EΠ∗ = 2.51
Table 3.5: Optimal assortments, price vectors, and expected profit values
as a function of K and b in Example 3.2.






, for k = ji + 1, ..., ji+1 − 1, (3.18)
ck − cjm
qk − qjm
≥ θ̄, for k = jm + 1, ..., n. (3.19)
Further, the optimal assortment S∗ is unique.
Lemma 3.4.6 implies that the products which are not included in S∗ have a
higher cost-quality ratio than products in S∗ with a lower quality level. Moreover,
only one assortment satisfies these conditions (remember that S∗ is defined as the
optimal set of products with strictly positive purchase probability). It follows that
the optimal assortment remains the same whatever the distribution of customers’
valuation is (as long as it is IFR) as stated in Corollary 3.4.7.
Corollary 3.4.7. If K = 0, the optimal set S∗ does not depend on the distribution
of customer valuation F .
This is a surprising result since, in the Shortest path ‘Endo’ algorithm, the
non-zero arc costs depend on F , therefore, one would expect the shortest path
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and the corresponding assortment to vary with F as in the exogenous prices case.
We provide an intuition for this result in our next section.
For the case when K = 0, we use the properties in Lemma 3.4.6 to develop
a more efficient algorithm. For each product i, starting with a fictitious product 0,
we identify the next product to be included in the optimal assortment by looking
for a product which satisfies conditions (3.11) and (4.4). We examine candidate
products one by one, starting from the highest quality product (i.e., product n)
down to product i + 1. After identifying the optimal set S∗, we compute the
optimal prices using Lemma 3.4.2. The algorithm is formally stated as follows.
ALGORITHM: Zero Fixed Cost Algorithm
• Step 0. S∗ = ∅, i = 0.
• Step 1. If i < n,









for k = i+ 1, ..., j − 1




• Step 2: Use Lemma 3.4.2 to obtain ~r∗.
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Proposition 3.4.8. The set S∗ obtained from Zero Fixed Cost Algorithm is optimal
when K = 0.
Corollary 3.4.9. The complexity of the Zero Fixed Cost Algorithm is O(n2).
In practice the Zero Fixed Cost algorithm can be used whenever the ad-
vertising costs and other fixed cost are negligible, which is more likely to be true
for online retailers. Barghava & Choudhary (2001) previously studied this set-
ting. They provide conditions under which the optimal assortment contains all
n products, i.e., S∗ = {1, ..., n} and conditions under which it contains only the
product with the highest quality, i.e., S∗ = {n}. In contrast, our work provides
an efficient algorithm to identify the optimal solution for any (~c, ~q).
There is a nice graphical interpretation for the optimal solution when
K = 0: on a two dimensional graph the functions θqj−cj for j = 1, ..., n are drawn
as a function of θ, the optimal assortment corresponds to the set of products that
belong to the upper envelope of the lines in the positive quadrant for θ ∈ [θ, θ].
Figure 3.4 shows the corresponding graph for Example 3.2 with K = 0 and
b = 1. From the graph, we can see the optimal assortment is {2, 3} since these
two products belong to the upper envelope. We formalize this observation in the
following Corollary.
Corollary 3.4.10. When K = 0, j ∈ S∗ if and only if there exists at least two
values of θ ∈ [θ, θ] such that θqj − cj = maxi=1,...,n(θqi − ci).
In Example 3.2, we observe that, if for a given value of b, a product is







Figure 3.4: Graphical interpretation for S∗ in Example 3.2 with K = 0 and
b = 1.
formally prove that this property holds whenever the inverse hazard rate function
η(θ) is linear in θ. Examples of distributions having linear inverse hazard rate
include exponential distributions and F = 1 − (1 − θ)b with b > 0.
Lemma 3.4.11. Suppose η(θ) = αθ + β, where α ≤ 0 and β are constants. The
optimal price of any product in S∗ = {j1, ..., jm} with j1 < ... < jm depends only




for i = 1, ..., m. (3.20)
We use this result to develop a faste algorithm for the case of linear η(θ).
Proposition 3.4.12. Suppose η(θ) = αθ + β, where α ≤ 0 and β are constants.




j = 1, ..., n.
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By Proposition 3.4.12, the problem with endogenous prices can be solved
using the algorithm for the exogenous prices case when the inverse hazard rate
function is linear. This result is useful because our solution method for the
exogenous case is generally faster than that for the endogenous case (despite the
fact that they have the same theoretical complexity). This is because the set of
nodes in Shortest Path ‘Exo’ is generally smaller than the set of nodes in Shortest
Path ‘Endo’.
In the special case where K = 0 and η(θ) is linear, the following proposi-
tion provides an another method to obtain the optimal solution.
Proposition 3.4.13. When K = 0 and η(θ) = αθ + β, where α ≤ 0 and β are
constants, j ∈ S∗ if and only if there exists at least two values of θ ∈ [θ, θ] such
that θqj − rj = maxi=1,...,n(θqi − ri) where ri =
ci+βqi
1−α
for i = 1, ..., n.
Proposition 3.4.13 shows when K = 0 and η(θ) is linear, the optimal
assortment can also be obtained graphically by looking for the upper envelope of
the utility curves drawn in the positive quadrant for θ ∈ [θ, θ] for each product
using prices rj =
cj+βqj
1−α
for j = 1, ..., n as shown in the following example. Note
that this method has the same complexity as the Zero Fixed Cost Algorithm. The
following example illustrates how it works.
Example 3.3. (Cont’d from Examples 3.1 and 3.2) Let ~c, ~q and the customer
valuation distribution F (θ) be as in Examples 3.1 and 3.2. We have η(θ) = 1−θ
b
so the inverse hazard rate is linear in θ (with α = −1
b
and β = 1
b
). When b = 0,
we obtain $17.5, $20.25 and $75 respectively for the prices of products 1, 2 and
75
3. In Figure 3.5, each line corresponds to the utility that customers get from
each product when they are offered at these prices. The upper envelope of the
three lines in the positive quadrant only intersects the lines from products 2 and







Figure 3.5: Upper envelope graph for Example 3.3.
In summary, we have developed a number of efficient algorithms to iden-
tify the optimal assortment when prices are endogenous. Table 3.6 provides a
summary of our solution methods as a function ofK and η(θ). Note that all of the
solution methods of complexity can be prefaced by the elimination of dominated
products from the set of products to consider.
3.5 Discussion and Insights
In Sections 3.3 and 3.4 we show how to obtain the optimal solution ef-




Linear inverse rate function η(θ)
K > 0 Shortest Path ‘Endo’ use Shortest Path ‘Exo’ with (3.20)
O(n3) O(n3)
K = 0 Zero Fixed Cost Algorithm Upper envelope with (3.20)
O(n2) O(n2)
Table 3.6: Solution methods to identify the optimal assortment.
discuss some interesting properties of these solutions and compare the two cases.
We have shown that the optimal assortment in the exogenous prices case
may contain dominated products while the optimal assortment in the endogenous
prices case does not. This is because the retailer who sets prices is able to
increase the expected profit by pricing dominated products high enough so that
no customer buys them. Including a product with zero purchase probability in
the assortment does not increase the profit, therefore, the optimal assortment
does not contain dominated products. In contrast, the retailer who does not
set prices may want to include dominated products because products prices are
generally sub-optimal (in the sense that they are different from the prices that
she would choose if she could).
Another interesting observation is about how the distribution of customer
valuations affects the optimal assortment. When the fixed cost is negligible (i.e.,
K = 0) and prices are endogenous, the optimal assortment does not vary with
the distribution of customer valuations (as long as it is IFR). On the contrary,
the optimal assortment may vary with the distribution of customer valuations in
the exogenous prices case. The underlying reason is as follows. When prices are
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decision variables, the conditions of Lemma 3.4.6 guarantee that there exists a
set of prices such that each product in S∗ makes a positive contribution to the
expected profit. Because the retailer has the ability to set prices, these condi-
tions are sufficient to guarantee the optimality of assortment. However, in the
exogenous case, the retailer has to work with prices which are often suboptimal so
the contribution of a product to the expected profit can become negative as the
distribution of customer valuation changes. Therefore, the optimal assortment
might change with the distribution of customer valuation.
Note that, in the endogenous prices case, the retailer who only has incom-
plete information about the distribution of customer valuations can still identify
the optimal assortment as long as the distribution is known to be an IFR distri-
bution. However, setting optimal prices requires knowledge of the distribution.
We use Example 3.4 below to further analyze how the optimal assortments
in the two cases differ.
Example 3.4. A retailer can choose from two vertically differentiated products
with ~c = (1, 0.5) and ~q = (20, 40). The distribution is F (θ) = 1 − (1 − θ)b with
support [0, 1], b = 6 and K = 0.
When the prices are fixed with ~r = (2, 19), it is optimal to offer both
products. However when the retailer is free to set prices, it is optimal to offer
only product 2 at a price of $6.56.
This example shows that the optimal assortment in the exogenous prices
case can contain two products i and j such that ci > cj and qi < qj , that is, one
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product has a higher quality and a lower price than another product. By Lemma
3.4.1, this is not true in the endogenous price case. Table 3.7 summarizes the
properties of the optimal assortment in both cases in terms of cost, quality levels,
and selling prices in both settings.
Condition† Exogenous prices case Endogenous
prices case













not necessarily true true


















< θ̄ not necessarily true true
† r̂j = rj in the exogenous prices case and r̂j = r∗j in the endogenous prices case.
‡ Because can hold as an equality in the exogenous prices case.
Table 3.7: Comparison of the properties of the optimal assortment in
exogenous and endogenous prices case.
From the comparison of the optimal assortments in Examples 3.1 and 3.2,
along with Example 3.4, we find that the optimal assortment in the exogenous
prices case can be larger or smaller than the optimal assortment in the endogenous
prices case and that one is not necessarily a subset of the other. In particular, a
product which is included in the optimal assortment when prices are fixed may be
dropped when the retailer is able to set her own prices. It is therefore necessary
for a retailer who acquires the freedom of setting selling prices to re-evaluate her
whole assortment and re-optimize using the appropriate algorithm.
Example 3.5 illustrates some interesting properties of the optimal assort-
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ment as the set of candidate products to choose from shrinks.
Example 3.5. A retailer can choose from three vertically differentiated products
with ~c = (2, 6, 10) and ~q = (10, 14, 20). The distribution of customer valuations
is uniform over [0, 1] and K = 0.
The optimal assortment when prices are endogenous is S∗ = {1, 3} and
optimal prices are r∗1 = 6 and r
∗
3 = 15.
Now suppose that product 1 is no longer available, that is, the retailer can
only offer a subset of {2, 3}. In that case, the optimal assortment is {2, 3} and
the optimal prices are r∗2 = 10 and r
∗
3 = 15.
From this example, we find that, if a product from the optimal assort-
ment becomes unavailable, for example, because the manufacturer discontinues
its production or the retailer stock outs of it and the manufacturer is not able to
refill the inventory in a timely manner, then it may be optimal for the retailer to
include new products in the assortment. This result provides a possible explana-
tion for why some manufacturers would continue to offer products which are not
included in the optimal assortment when the retailers can choose from the full list
of potential products (another possible explanation is that the manufacturer also
sells his products to other retailers operating in different markets and for whom
the optimal assortment is different because their cost structure is different). Note
that this property is also true in the exogenous prices case. To see this, consider
the counterpart of example 3.5 where prices are exogenous and the price vector
~r = (6, 10, 15) and notice that the optimal assortments are the same.
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However Proposition 3.5.1 shows that, when prices are endogenous and
K = 0, it is never optimal to drop a product which is still available from the
optimal assortment.
Proposition 3.5.1. Suppose K = 0. Let S∗
N
be the optimal assortment when
the set of potential products to choose from is N. Let S∗
N′
denote the optimal
assortment when the set of potential products to choose from is N′ ⊆ N. We
have (S∗
N




We study the problem of a retailer offering an assortment of vertically dif-
ferentiated products to customers who differ in their valuation of quality. We first
consider the scenario where prices are exogenously determined and the retailer’s
only decision is to decide the set of products to offer. We show that the problem
of finding the optimal assortment can be modeled as a shortest path problem,
which has complexity O(n3). Interestingly we show that the optimal assortment
may contain dominated products, i.e., products with has a lower quality, lower
selling price, and higher cost than one other product.
Second, we examine the setting where the retailer can also determine the
selling prices of products which are included in the assortment. We show that this
problem can also be modeled as a shortest path with complexity O(n3). However,
in practice, this problem usually takes longer to solve because the network gen-
erally contains more nodes and arcs. When the fixed cost associated with each
offered product is negligible (i.e., K = 0), we develop a more efficient algorithm,
81
with complexity O(n2). If the distribution of customer valuations has a linear in-
verse hazard rate we show that the optimal prices can be obtained independently
of the optimal assortment so that the optimal assortment can be found by using
the solution method developed for the exogenous prices case.
Barghava & Choudhary (2001) consider the problem of selecting and pric-
ing vertically differentiated products in the absence of fixed cost but only give a
partial characterization of the optimal solution. In contrast, we provide efficient
methods to obtain the optimal assortment for any quality levels and variables
cost, in the presence of fixed cost and also consider the exogenous prices case.
Further, we provide a number of interesting insights and guidelines to practition-
ers regarding their product mix strategy.
Nowadays, most retailers still do not use the tools of assortment planning
to manage and price their products. For instance, Amazon currently determines
the selling prices of its products separately, not as a category. As a result there
could be some inconsistencies in the selling prices. In our future work, we plan
to analyze data from online retailers and look for opportunities to improve their
profitability using our model.
There are a number of interesting extensions to our work. First, we assume
that the products differ with respect to only one attribute which can be regarded
a combination of a product’s many characteristics. We are interested in explic-
itly considering multiple attributes to capture the complexity of consumer choice.
Second, we do not consider the case in which the retailer may have constraints
when determining the selling prices of products. For example, the retailer does
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not want to set a price that is higher than a competitor’s selling price. Third,
our model assumes that the retailer is a monopolist and that the product quality
levels and variable costs are fixed and determined by the manufacturer(s). In-
teresting extensions would be to consider a setting in which the manufacturer(s)
choose(s) the product quality levels and transfer costs in anticipation of the re-
tailer’s assortment choice or a setting in which two or more retailers compete in
prices when selling the same manufacturers’ products. Finally, our model does
not include the presence of inventory and therefore does not incorporate the im-
pact of stock-outs and the resulting substitution behavior of customers. We plan
to explore these extensions in our future research.
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Chapter 4
Optimal Pricing and Bundling of Vertically
Differentiated Information Goods
4.1 Introduction
Bundling has become an increasingly popular pricing strategy for sellers
to increase their sales and profits. We can easily find examples for a wide range
of products, for instance, telecommunication products (e.g., internet, phone, and
TV), food (e.g., bags of potato chips of different flavors packed into one big box),
vacation packages (e.g., airline ticket, hotel, and transportation including shuttle
or rent-a-car), and software (e.g., Microsoft Office including Microsoft Word,
Excel, Access, and Powerpoint). The iTunes store is the world’s leading online
music and TV shows store with over 10 million songs and over 30,000 TV episodes
for sale. When buying on iTunes, consumers can choose to buy songs and TV
episdoes individually or in a bundle, in the form of an album or a complete TV
season.
Bundling can be classified into two categories: price bundling and product
bundling (Stermersch and Tellis 2002). Price bundling is the sale of two or
more separate products in a package at a discount without any integration of
the products while product bundling is the integration and sale of two or more
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separate products or services at any price. Sellers use three strategies for price
and product bundling: (1) no bundling, where each product is sold individually;
(2) pure bundling, where products are sold only in a package; and (3) mixed
bundling, where products are sold individually and in a bundle. Motivated by
the successful practice of the iTunes, in this essay, we study the assortment
planning problem with price bundling and mixed bundling strategy. For ease
of exposition, we define a product sold individually as a component. Songs can
be ordered based on their popularity which is displayed on iTunes, so we assume
that they are vertically differentiated; consequently, if all the songs have the
same price, we assume that all customers would prefer a more popular song to
a less popular one. We model the customer choice using a widely applied pure
characteristic demand model (Bhargava and Choudhary 2001). We address the
following questions: which individual components should the firm offer? Should
the firm offer a bundle containing all the components? And how should the firm
price the offered individual components and the bundle in order to maximize its
profit?
4.2 Literature Review
As the popularity of bundling has grown in practice, so has academic
research on bundling from economics, marketing and operational perspective.
Stremersch & Tellis (2002) provide a comprehensive summary of early research
on bundling in economics and marketing literature. The economists start with
the work Stigler (1963) and study whether the bundling is beneficial to the sell-
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ers or the consumers. Stigler uses a vector of reservation prices to represent
customer demand information. Customers choose the product maximizing their
surplus, i.e., difference between their reservation price and the product price.
The result shows that bundling can increase the seller’s profit for two negatively
correlated goods. Utilizing Stigler’s framework, Adams & Yellen (1976) consider
more than two customer segments and show that mixed bundling is typically
optimal. Schmalensee (1984) assumes that reservation prices follow a bivariate
normal distribution and uses numerical analysis to show that mixed bundling is
a favorable strategy especially for negative correlated products. McAfee et al.
(1989) identify the conditions under which mixed bundling is preferred for two
goods. Salinger (1995) uses a graphical analysis to demonstrate that the ben-
efit of bundling relates to the correlation of reservation prices among products,
demand function and cost of products. Venkatesh & Kamakura (2003) study
the optimal bundling strategies for complements and substitute goods. All these
studies focus on the case of two products.
Due to the complexity in analyzing bundles, few general results are avail-
able for bundles of more than two goods. Bakos & Brynjolfsson (1999) and Geng
et al. (2005) examine the optimality condition of the pure bundling strategy for
a large numbers of information goods with negligible marginal cost. Chuang &
Sirbu (1999)) show that selling all individual goods and the bundle of all goods
dominates pure bundling or no bundling for academic journals.
Another stream of research focus on customer behavior, such as how con-
sumers evaluate product bundles, see for example Yadav & Monroe (1993), Yadav
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(1994), Chung & Rao (2003), Jedidi et al. (2003). Also, several studies use op-
timization approaches to design and price the bundle. Hanson & Martin (1990)
investigate how to determine the optimal bundle prices for firms to maximize the
profit given the number of customers and their reservation price in each segment.
They formulate the problem as a mixed integer linear model and find the profit
maximizing bundle prices without considering the entire set of feasible solutions.
Bitran & Ferrer (2007) address the problem of how to determine the profit max-
imizing composition and the price of a bundle meeting specified constraints in
a competitive environment. They formulate the problem as a nonlinear mixed
integer problem and propose a solution approach to determine the optimal com-
position and price of the bundle. Hitt & Chen (2005) and Wu et al. (2008) study
the customized bundle pricing strategy for information goods using non-linear
programming approach. In the customized bundling strategy, customers choose
a certain number of goods out of a large pool of different goods, and pay the price
dependent only on the number of goods in the bundle regardless of the specific
content in the bundle.
As the above discussion indicates, past work has mainly focused on bundling
of two goods and few available results are for general bundles of more than two
goods. To our best knowledge, our work is the first one to work on the mixed
bundling strategy for vertically differentiated information goods.
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4.3 Model
Suppose a firm sells n vertically differentiated components and a bundle
containing all n components.. Let qj denote the quality level of component j.
Without loss of generality, we assume that q1 ≥ q2 ≥ ... ≥ qn ≥ 0. The marginal
cost of component j is cj and component j is sold at price rj . For notational
convenience, suppose we have a fictitious product 0 with q0 = c0 = 0. Let
~c = (c1, ..., cj) and ~r = (r1, ..., rj).
Let Qn+1, Cn+1 and Rn+1 respectively denote the quality level, variable
cost and selling price of the bundle containing all n components. We assume
that the quality level of the bundle is Qn+1 = q1 + q2 + ... + qn + qn+1 where
qn+1 ≥ 0 captures the extra benefit to the customer (convenience, packaging,
etc.) of buying all products into a bundle rather than one by one. We assume
the marginal cost of the bundle is additive, i.e, Cn+1 = c1 + ... + cn. For ease of
exposition, let cn+1 = 0.
Customers can either buy one component, multiple components or the
bundle. We assume that customers are characterized by their willingness to pay
for one unit of quality in the product category, or valuation, which is measured by
θ. A customer with valuation θ gets utility θqj −rj from buying component j and
θQn+1−Rn+1 from buying the bundle. We assume that utilities are additive, i.e.,
the utility of buying components 1 and 2 is θ(q1 + q2) − (r1 + r2) for a customer
with valuation parameter θ. This is a standard assumption in price bundling
since the components are usually consumed separately. Also, we assume that
customers do not get a positive utility from buying more than one unit of the
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same component or bundle. Without loss of generality, we assume that the utility
of not buying anything is equal to zero.
Let F (θ) denote the distribution of customers’ valuations. Let h(θ) =
f(θ)
1−F (θ)
be the failure rate of F and ξ(θ) = θh(θ) be its generalized failure rate.
F (θ) is an increasing failure rate (IFR) distribution if h(θ) is weakly increasing
for all θ. F (θ) is an increasing generalized failure rate (IGFR) distribution if
ξ(θ) is weakly increasing for all θ as defined in Lariviere & Porteus (2001). Note
that if a distribution is IFR it is also IGFR, but the reverse does not hold since
many IGFR distributions are not IFR. Most common distributions are IGFR
distributions, e.g., uniform, normal, logistic, chi-squared, exponential, Laplace,
and Weibull distributions. We use η(θ) = 1
h(θ)
to denote the inverse failure rate
function. If F (θ) is an IFR distribution, then η′(θ) < 0. In what follows, we
assume that F is an IFR distribution unless otherwise specified.
In the example of iTunes, the “quality level” of a song/or series episode
can be estimated by the customers through customer and critical reviews, as well
as the “popularity” index which measures the relative frequency with which each
song or episode has been downloaded by previous users. The valuation θ of a
customer represents the degree of familiarity with and attachment to a particular
artist’s work (in the case of music). For example, a fan of a particular rock
artist is characterized by a very high value of θ for the music of that artist, while
a customer who in general despises rock music will have a very low valuation
θ. Since all the songs of a particular artist are usually of a similar genre, it is
reasonable to assume that a customer has the same valuation for all the 10 to
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15 songs in an album. Similarly, all the episodes of a show are of the same kind
(e.g., comedy, drama, reality...), hence it is reasonable to assume that a customer




be the valuation of the customer who gets zero utility from
buying component j. We assume that the firm decides prices such that
θ ≤ θ1 ≤ ... ≤ θn ≤ θ̄. (4.1)
It follows that every customer with valuation parameter θ > θj gets a
positive utility from buying component j but also a positive utility from buying
components 1 to j − 1. Hence, in the absence of the bundle, a customer with
taste parameter θ ∈ [θj , θj+1) buys components 1 to j. Such a customer buys
the bundle if and only if θQn+1 − Rn+1 ≥ θ(q1 + ... + qj) − (r1 + ... + rj) and
θQn+1 − Rn+1 ≥ 0. Let θn+1 =
Rn+1−(r1+...+rn)
qn+1
be the lowest value of θ such that
a customer buys the bundle.
For given values of ~r and Rn+1, customers with θ ≥ θn+1 buy the bundle.
Customers with θ < θn+1 and θ ∈ [θj , θj+1) buy components 1 to j. Finally,
customers with θ < θn+1 and θ < θ1 do not buy anything. Let Pn+1 be the
proportion of customers who buy the bundle, Pj be the proportion of customers
who buy components 1 to j and P0 be the proportion of customer who do not
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buy anything, we have:
Pn+1 = 1 − F (θn+1)
Pj = F (θj+1) − F (θj)
P0 =
{
F (θ1) if θn+1 > θ1
F (θn+1) if θn+1 > θ1
We can write the profit function as follows:





(F (θi+1) − F (θi))(r1 + ... + ri − (c1 + ... + ci))





This model is a special case of the model for the general vertically differen-
tiated products in Chapter 3, where we consider a product category of vertically
differentiated products in which each customer buys at most one product. To
see this, let product j be composed of components 1 to j, for j = 1, ..., n. The
variable cost of product j is Cj ≡ c1 + ...+ cj, its quality level is Qj ≡ q1 + ...+ qj
and its selling price is Rj ≡ r1 + ...+ rj . Also let product n+1 correspond to the
bundle, with variable cost Cn+1, quality level Qn+1 and selling price Rn+1. Each
customer buys at most one unit of product j, for j = 1, ...n + 1. We exploit this
analogy between the two models in Section 4.4. Note that in Sections 4.5.2 and
4.5.4, our model is no longer equivalent to the model for the general vertically dif-
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ferentiated products. Moreover, we provide more results about conditions under
which offering the bundle is optimal and more insights under special cases.
Note that there is a one-to-one correspondence between ~r, Rn+1 and ~θ =
(θ1, ..., θn+1). Let ~θ be the vector corresponding to ~r, Rn+1, then we can rewrite





(1 − F (θi))(θiqi − ci)
The firm’s profit maximization problem is
max~θ EΠ(
~θ)
s.t. θ ≤ θ1 ≤ θ2 ≤ ... ≤ θn ≤ θn+1 ≤ θ̄
(4.2)
4.4 Results
Without loss of generality we can assume that θn ≤ θn+1 ≤ θ. This
condition along with (4.1), allow us to divide the components into two groups.
For j = 1, ..., n, we either have θj = θj+1 or θj < θj+1. In the first case, no
customer buys components 1 to j only, while, in the second, some customers buy
components 1 to j. Similarly for the bundle, we can either have θn+1 = θ or
θn+1 < θ. In the first case, no customer buys the bundle, while in the second,
some customers buy the bundle. Given θj for j = 1, ..., n + 1, let S = {j =
1, ..., n+ 1 : θj < θj+1 and θj < θ̄}.
The firm’s objective is to find the optimal set of components and/or the
bundle to offer and charge optimal prices for the offered products. A naive way is
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to enumerate all the possible combination of components and the bundle, which
is very time consuming. We aim to develop efficient methods to identify the
optimal set and characterize the optimal prices for offered products. We first
establish some nice properties about the optimal set S defined above. Let the
optimal set S∗ = {j1, ..., jm} such that j1 < j2 < ... < jm. We denote j0 = 0.
Lemma 4.4.1. S∗ is optimal if and only if the costs and quality levels satisfy
c1 + ...+ cj1
q1 + ...+ qj1
<
cj1+1 + ...+ cj2
qj1+1 + ...+ qj2
< ... <
cjm−1+1 + ...+ cjm
qjm−1+1 + ...+ qjm
< θ̄, (4.3)









for k = ji + 1, ..., ji+1 − 1
c{jm+1}+...+ck
q{jm+1}+...+qk
> θ̄ for k > jm
(4.4)
Furthermore, S∗ is unique.
Lemma 4.4.1 shows that the ratio of the incremental cost to the incremen-
tal quality for each product in the optimal set is strictly increasing in the quality
level.
Suppose we identify the optimal set S∗, Lemma 4.4.2 provides a method
to compute the optimal prices r∗.





cji−1+1 + ...+ cji
qji−1+1 + ...+ qji
for i = 1, ..., m. (4.5)
where j0 = 0. For k /∈ S
∗, we have θ∗k = θ
∗
k+1 if k < jm and θ
∗
k = θ̄ if k > jm. The
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qji for i = 1, ..., m− 1,
r∗jm = θ
∗




+ ...+ r∗jm−1 + θ
∗
jm(qjm−1+1 + qjm) if jm = n+ 1.
Bundling is a prevalent sales strategy. We next characterize the necessary
and sufficient condition for adopting the bundling strategy.
Lemma 4.4.3. The optimal set S∗ includes the bundle, i.e., n + 1 ∈ S∗, if and
only if
ci + ...+ cn
qi + ... + qn + qn+1
< θ for i = 1, ..., n. (4.6)
Barghava & Choudhary (2001) only prove that (4.6) is a sufficient con-
dition. We show that it is also a necessary condition. Also Lemma 4.4.3 shows
that the decision whether or not to include the bundle does not depend on the
distribution F (as long as it is IFR).
Firms also adopt the pure bundling strategy at times. Proposition 4.4.4
provides the conditions under which the optimal set only includes the bundle.
Proposition 4.4.4. The pure bundling strategy is optimal, i.e., S∗ = {n + 1} if
and only if
c1 + ... + cn
q1 + ... + qn + qn+1
≤
c1 + ...+ ci
q1 + ...+ qi
for i = 1, ..., n (4.7)
Intuitively, pure bundling is optimal if and only if it is more efficient to
manufacture the bundle, i.e, if the cost-quality ratio of the bundle is the lowest.
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When the conditions of Proposition 4.4.4 are not satisfied, finding the
optimal solution can be done through an exhausting search over all possible sets
S∗. Using Lemma 4.4.1, we can show that it is never optimal to have n and
n + 1 ∈ S∗; hence, the number of sets S to consider is 2n − 1, which is still time
consuming.
Notice that the contribution to the expected profit of component ji in
the set S depends only on the adjacent components/products ji−1 and ji+1 since
other products do not have impact on the purchase probability of product ji.
This property enables us to model this problem as a shortest path problem. Fur-
thermore, the adjacent products have an impact on the contribution of product
ji, therefore, we need to use a pair of product as a node in the graph. The arc
cost is proportional to the expected profit of a product. Using the properties of
Lemma 4.4.1, we are able to construct a parsimonious network as follows.
ALGORITHM: Shortest Path Algorithm
• Step 1. Construct node set: V consists of the following nodes
V =
{
(0, i) : i = 1, ..., n+ 1 and
c1 + ... + ci
q1 + ... + qi
< θ̄
}
∪{(0, 0), (n+ 2, n+ 2)}
∪{(j, n + 2) : j = 1, ..., n+ 1 and
c1 + ...+ cj




(i, j) : 1 ≤ i < j ≤ n+ 1 and
ci+1 + ... + cj





where (0, 0) and (n + 2, n + 2) are fictitious starting and ending node re-
spectively.
• Step 2. Construct arc set: Add an arc from node (i, j) to (l, k) ∈ V to set







< θ̄ if k < n+ 2
ci+1+...+cj
qi+1+...+qj
< θ̄ if k = n+ 2 and l < k
• Step 3. Compute arc costs:
c(i,j),(j,k) =
{
− [rj+1 + ....+ rk − (cj+1 + ...+ ck)] [1 − F (θk)] if k < n+ 2
0 if k = n+ 2
where θk is the solution to θk = η(θk) +
c{j+1}+...+ck
q{j+1}+...+qk
and rl = θkql for
l = j + 1, ..., k.
• Step 4. Solve the shortest path problem from (0, 0) to (n+ 2, n+ 2).
Theorem 4.4.5. The problem of finding an optimal assortment reduces to a short-
est path problem between (0, 0) and (n + 2, n+ 2).
Corollary 4.4.6. The complexity of the method to find an optimal expected profit
is O(n3).
Using the Zero Fixed Cost Algorithm stated in Section 3.4.3 of Chapter 3,
we develop a more efficient algorithm to identify the optimal bundling strategy.
Algorithm: Backward Search Algorithm
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• Step 0. S∗ = ∅, i = 0.
• Step 1. If i < n + 1,









for k = i+ 1, ..., j − 1




• Step 2: Use Lemma 4.4.2 to obtain ~r∗ and/or R∗n+1.
Proposition 4.4.7. The set S obtained from the Algorithm is optimal.
Example 4.1. A firm can choose from six components with ~q = [5, 4.3, 3.3, 2.5,
1.0, 0.8] and ~c = [3, 2.5, 1.6, 1.5, 1, 0.5] and one bundle containing all the compo-
nents with qn+1 = 0.5. she knows customer valuations follow a uniform distribu-
tion with support [0, 1]. The firm decides what products of offer and how much
to charge on each offered product in order to maximize the profit.
Using the backward search algorithm, we get the optimal set S∗ = {1, 2,
3, 4, 7}, and the retailer sets the price such that some customers purchase the
first 3 or 4 components or the bundle. From Lemma 4.4.2, we obtain the optimal
values of θ and prices are as follows.
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θ r∗ included in S∗?
component 1 0.78 3.91 Yes
component 2 0.78 3.36 Yes
component 3 0.78 2.58 Yes
component 4 0.80 2.00 Yes
component 5 0.83 / No
component 6 0.83 / No
bundle 0.83 13.75 Yes
Table 4.1: Optimal θ and prices in Example 4.1.
Proposition 4.4.8. The optimal assortment S∗ includes all the components in the










In the presence of the bundle, if
ci + ...+ cn
qi + ... + qn + qn+1
< θ for i = 1, ..., n. (4.9)
the optimal assortment S∗
′




cj+2 + ... + cn
qj+2 + ... + qn+1
.
Moreover, the prices for components 1 to j in the presence of the bundle are the
same as those in the absence of the bundle.
Proposition 4.4.8 reveals that if a firm’s best strategy is to offer all the
components in the absence of the bundle, and she wants to introduce bundling
strategy later, she only needs to determine the best optimal price R∗n+1 without
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changing the prices for the components.
4.5 Special Cases
In practice, the cost functions are special under some situations; for in-
stance, iTunes distribute each song at an approximate marginal cost of $0.50
according to Wu et al. (2008); and the advanced technology makes even possible
to distribute information goods at negligible marginal cost. The firm may charge
the same price for all components following the specific industry tradition. For
example, ITunes used to charge $0.99 for each individual song. We next exploit
properties under different conditions.
4.5.1 Same Positive Marginal Cost and Different Component Price
For many practical examples (such as iTunes) the variable cost is the same
for each component, that is, c1 = ... = cn = c. In this case we are able to obtain
full characterization of the optimal solution.
Proposition 4.5.1. Assume that q1 > q2 > ... > qn.
(1) If
(n− i+ 1)c
qi + ...+ qn + qn+1
< θ for i = 1, ..., n (4.10)
(1.a) If there exists a positive integer 0 < j < n satisfying
qj >




then S∗ = {1, ..., ĵ, n+ 1} where ĵ be the largest integer j satisfying condi-
tion (4.11)
(1.b) If there is no positive integer satisfying condition (4.11), i.e.,
q1 <
qj+1 + ... + qn+1
n− 1
, (4.12)
then the pure bundling strategy is optimal, i.e., S∗ = {n+ 1}.
(2) If condition (4.10) is not satisfied, then S∗ = {1, ..., j̃} where j̃ is the largest




Condition (4.10) determines whether or not the bundle should be included
in the optimal assortment. For components, we compare the quality of a com-
ponent with the average quality of the components with lower quality level. The
optimal set includes all components whose quality is higher than the average
quality of the components with lower quality level.
4.5.1.1 Example and insights
In this section we assume that the distribution of customer valuations
has a a beta distribution1 with a = 1, i.e., the probability density function is
f(θ) = b(1 − θ)b−1 and cumulative distribution function is F (θ) = 1 − (1 − θ)b
with θ ∈ [0, 1].
1The probability density function is B(θ; a, b) = θ
a−1(1−θ)b−1






Suppose condition (4.10) is satisfied, then from Proposition 4.5.1, we have








. We have θ∗j =
ĉjb+1
b+1
, r∗j = θ
∗
j qj for
j ≤ ĵ and R∗n+1 = r
∗
1 + ...+ r
∗
ĵ
+ θn+1(qĵ+1 + ... + qn+1).
Next, we perform a sensitivity analysis with respect to c and b.
• Cost and Purchasing Levels. Customers with θ < θ∗1 purchase nothing













An increase in the cost c results in a strict increase in θ1 and θn+1. Therefore,
as cost increases, fewer customers purchase the bundle and the proportion
of customers making a purchase decreases too.
• Market Evolution. The distribution of customer valuations changes with
the value of b. For a new product early-stage market, more consumers are
low type ones, i.e., having low θ. As the market matures, the distribution
of customers over purchasing level evens out and more consumers are high















The proportion of consumers buying the bundle is




= (1 − θn+1)





= (1 − θn+1)
b
[

































and ω(∞) < 0. Hence ∂Pn+1
∂b
< 0. The proportion of customers who do not
make purchase is
P0 = 1 − (1 − θ1)













This result shows that in early-stage market, the proportion of customers
buying nothing is high and a low bundling price is a good strategy to
penetrate the market. As the market matures, the firm increase the price
of the bundle and the total market share increases.
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[1 − F (θ∗i )](r
∗
i − c)


























+ ... + r∗n+1 − (n − ĵ)c
] (n − ĵ)b




























[1 − F (θn+1)]







































Profits are strictly decreasing with c and b.
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4.5.2 Same Positive Marginal Cost and Same Component Price
Some retailers, such as iTunes, charge the same price for each component.
Under this situation, we have c1 = ... = cn = c, r1 = ... = rn = r. Let tj be the
bundle price that a customer is indifferent buying between components from 1 to
j and the bundle, where
tj = jr + r
qj+1 + .... + qn + qn+1
qj
for j = 1, ..., n.
















[1 − F (θn+1)] (Rn+1 − nc) if Rn+1 ≤ t1
[1 − F (θn+1)] [Rn+1 − jr − c(n− j)]
+
∑j
i=1[1 − F (θi)](r − c)
if tj < Rn+1 ≤ tj+1, j = 1, ..., n− 1
∑n
i=1[1 − F (θi)](r − c) if tn < Rn+1
Note that the expected profit function is continuous in Rn+1:





[F (θi+1) − F (θi)] i(r − c)
= EΠ(t−j ),















1 − F (θn+1) −
f(θn+1)(Rn+1−nc)
Qn+1
if Rn+1 ≤ t1
1 − F (θn+1) −
f(θn+1)[Rn+1−jr−(n−j)c]
Qn+1−Qj
if tj < Rn+1 ≤ tj+1, j = 1, ..., n
0 if tn < Rn+1
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= 1 − F (θn+1) −












= 1 − F (θn+1) −
f(θn+1)[Rn+1 − (j − 1)r − (n− j + 1)c]
Qn+1 −Qj−1
















Hence, there could be multiple stationary points and the global maximum can
be found at tj for some j = 1, ..., n.
Proposition 4.5.2. For a given r, if
Qn+1 −Qj
n− j
> qj for j = 1, ..., n− 1 (4.13)
then the FOC is
θn+1 = η(θn+1) +
(n− j)c
Qn+1 −Qj
for j = 0, ..., n− 1 (4.14)
and we get the optimal R∗n+1 by comparing the EΠ(Rn+1) at all points satisfying
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condition 4.14.
When both r and Rn+1 are decision variables, either mixed bundling strat-
egy or pure bundling strategy could be optimal.
4.5.3 Zero Marginal Cost and Different Component Price
Advances in information technology have greatly reduced the distribution
cost of information goods. It is now possible to sell information goods with
negligible marginal cost, i.e. c1 = ... = cn = 0. Bakos & Brynjolfsson (1999) and
Geng et al. (2005) assume that information goods have zero marginal cost.
In this case, (4.7) is satisfied and we show that pure bundling strategy is
always optimal.
Proposition 4.5.3. A firm, who sells information goods with negligible costs, al-
ways uses pure bundling strategy.
4.5.4 Zero Marginal Cost and Same Component Price
In this section, we look at the special case when c1 = ... = cn = 0 and
r1 = ... = rn = r.
Proposition 4.5.4. Assume the component price r is fixed. If F is a continuous
IGFR distribution, then θ∗n+1 is the unique solution to:
1 − F (θn+1) − θn+1f(θn+1) = 0. (4.15)
Let g(θ) = 1−F (θ)− θf(θ), and j∗ be the largest number of components
106
that customers may purchase. For IGFR continuous distribution, we have
g(θ∗n+1) = 0









F (θj) − F (θj−1) if j < j
∗
F (θ∗n+1) − F (θj) if j = j
∗












jr + (Qn+1 −Qj)θ
∗




























i=1(1 − F (θi))r if θj < θ
∗
n+1 ≤ θj+1




i=1(1 − F (θi))r if θn < θ
∗
n+1
Proposition 4.5.5. (a) EΠ∗ is increasing in qn+1 and qj for j = 1, ..., n, non-
decreasing in r.
(b) R∗n+1 is increasing in qn+1 and qj for j > j
∗, non-decreasing in r.
(c) j∗ is non-decreasing in qj and non-increasing in r.
Example 4.2. Let F (θ) = 1−(1−θ)b. Note that the uniform distribution on [0, 1]
is a special case of this distribution obtained by setting b = 1. If b > 1, then the
distribution function is concave, meaning that there are more customers with low
taste parameters. If 0 < b < 1, then the distribution function is convex, meaning
that there are more customers with high taste parameters. The generalized failure
rate is ξ(θ) = bθ
1−θ
, so F is IGFR.
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In this case, (4.15) becomes (1 − (b+ 1)θn+1) (1 − θn+1)

























b − (1 − θb+1)







if j = j∗
0 if j > j∗
Proposition 4.5.6. When both r and Rn+1 are decision variables and F is a con-
tinuous IGFR distribution, pure bundling is optimal.
Proposition 4.5.7. When both r and Rn+1 are decision variables, a mixed bundling
strategy such that some customers purchase the first component and some cus-
tomers purchase the bundle cannot be optimal for any distribution F .
Example 4.3. (Continuing from Example 4.2) When F (θ) = 1 − (1 − θ)b, it is






and r ≥ q1
b+1





and Pj = 0 for j = 1, ..., n, i.e., no customer buys individual components. The








We study the bundling problem of a retailer offering vertically differen-
tiated information goods. Although all customers prefer more to less for the
quality level, they value the quality level differently. We characterize the condi-
tions under which including the bundle is optimal, the conditions under which
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a pure bundling strategy is optimal, and the conditions under which a mixed
bundling strategy is optimal. We develop efficient methods, i.e., Shortest Path
Algorithm and Backward Search Algorithm with complexity O(n3) and O(n2)
respectively, to identify what components and/or the bundle to offer and address
how to optimally price the components and/or the bundle. Interestingly, we find
that, under some situations, introducing the bundle does not affect the prices of
components.
We study a number of special cases, such as the case of identical marginal
cost for all components (positive or zero) and the case in which all components are
sold at the same price. For these special cases, we provide valuable insights. For
instance, in the case of the same positive marginal cost and different component
price, we fully characterize the optimal bundling strategy. When the distribution
of customer valuations follows a special beta distribution, we show that a low
price for the bundle is a good strategy to penetrate a new product market where
customers have low valuations of quality. As the market evolutes, the bundling
prices increases and the total market share increases as well. When the marginal
cost is zero, our results show that a pure bundling strategy is optimal, which is
consistent with results in literature.
In this work, we only consider one bundle containing all the components.
One interesting extension of this work is to consider multiple bundles as iTunes
currently offers basic and “deluxe” bundles. Moreover, in practice, some cus-
tomers may buy one component, then update their valuation about the quality
level then buy some more. We are interested in examining this problem in the
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In this dissertation, we aim to develop a valuable decision support model
for an integrated sourcing and delivery optimization problem and provide retailers
insights and guidelines about their marketing strategy. In chapter 1, we develop
an integrated sourcing and delivery optimization model to minimize the total
procurement, transportation, and vehicle assignment cost. To obtain the near-
optimal solution within short time, we propose effective solution methodologies.
This approach, currently in use at a leading company to support their material
supply and delivery planning activities, yields significant savings of millions of
dollars annually. Moreover, this model is a valuable support tool for tactical
planning, capable of performing what-if analysis to provide useful managerial
insights.
For the assortment planning problem for vertically differentiated products,
in Chapter 3, we develop, efficient methods to identify the optimal assortment
to offer in the exogenous prices case, and to identify the optimal assortment to
offer and the optimal price to charge for each offered product in the endogenous
prices case. Our findings reveal that dominated products might be included in
the optimal assortment and the optimal assortment may vary with the distri-
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bution of customer valuations in the exogenous prices case. In contrast, in the
endogenous prices case, the optimal assortment never includes dominated prod-
ucts. Moreover, when the fixed cost is negligible, the optimal assortment does
not vary with the distribution of customer variations. Therefore, even when we
have incomplete information about customer valuations, we are able to identify
the optimal assortment.
For the problem of optimal pricing and bundling of vertically differenti-
ated information goods, we address how to choose the optimal bundling strategy.
We provide conditions under which introducing the bundle is desirable, condi-
tions under which pure bundling is optimal, and conditions under which mixed
bundling is optimal. We develop efficient methods to identify the set of com-
ponents and/or the bundle to offer and how much to charge for each offered
component and/or the bundle. In the special cases when variable costs and/or
the component prices are the same, we provide valuable insights such as how
the bundling strategy and purchasing probability of products change with the





Supplemental Material for Chapter 2
Notation
• Indices/Sets
– Q: set of suppliers
– J : set of customers
– V : set of vehicle types
– T : set of base time periods
– Q(j): subset of suppliers that can supply customer j ∈ J
– R(j): subset of suppliers to which vehicles can return after a delivery
to customer j ∈ J
– J(q): subset of customers that supplier q ∈ Q can serve q
– TJ(j): set of feasible delivery periods for customer j ∈ J in terms of
base periods
– TQ(q): set of open periods for supplier q ∈ Q in terms of base periods
– T (v): set of time periods for vehicle type v
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• Parameters
– Dj : number of deliveries of customer j
– Bj : average quantity per delivery of customer j
– Cvj : vehicle assignment cost per delivery to customer j by vehicle of
type v
– Pq: unit price of supplier q
– Iq: initial inventory of supplier q
– Mq: maximum supply capacity over the planning horizon of supplier
q
– Gqt: production quantity in period t of supplier q
– Nv: number of vehicles of type v available
– Fqj : full-load transportation cost ($ per mile) from supplier q to cus-
tomer j
– Ejq: empty-load transportation cost ($ per mile) from customer j to
supplier q
• Decision Variables
– xvqjt number of vehicles of type v that deliver material from supplier q
to customer j in period t, for all v ∈ V, j ∈ J, q ∈ Q(j), t ∈ TQ(q) ∩
TJ(j) ∩ T (v)
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– yvjqt number of vehicles of type v that go to supplier q after delivering
material to customer j in period t, for all v ∈ V, j ∈ J, q ∈ R(j), t ∈
TJ(j) ∩ T (v), t+ 1 ∈ TQ(q) ∩ T (v)
– rvqt number of vehicles of type v that enter the system at supplier q at
period t, for all v ∈ V, q ∈ Q, t ∈ TQ(q) ∩ T (v)
– svjt number of vehicles of type v that leave the system after delivering
to customer j in period t, for all v ∈ V, j ∈ J, t ∈ TJ(j) ∩ T (v)
Proof of Proposition 2.3.1. Consider any integer solution that a vehicle
delivers one full-load of material to customer j with unit demand from supplier
q in time period t; the left-hand-side (LHS) of constraint (2.8) xqjt equals 1.
Since customer j has unit demand, no delivery is made to customer j before time
period t, and thus no return trip from customer j to supplier q, i.e. yjq(t−τjq) = 0.
For the flow conservation constraint (2.5) at supplier q in time period t, the LHS
rqt +
∑
j∈J yjq(t−τjq) equals rqt +
∑
j′ 6=j yj′q(t−τj′q) , and the right hand side (RHS)
∑
j∈J xqjt is not smaller than xqjt. So, rqt +
∑
j′ 6=j yj′q(t−τj′q) ≥ xqjt . For other
time periods, the LHS of constraint (2.8) xqjt equals 0, and thus the inequality is
valid.
Proof of Proposition 2.3.2. Consider any integer solution that m(≥ 1) ve-
hicles delivery material to customers in subset J ′ from the subset of suppliers Q′
in time interval [t1, t2]. For supplier subset Q
′, time interval [t1, t2], and customer
subset J ′, the LHS of constraint (2.10) is at least m since those m vehicles de-
livering material in the subsystem (subset Q′ and subset J ′) enter the subsystem
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at supplier subset Q′ from outside the system, or at suppliers in subset Q′ from
customers, or at customers in subset J ′ from suppliers within the time interval.








Hence, the given solution satisfies this inequality.
Proof of Proposition 2.3.3. We prove the propositißon by checking two
cases: the minimum number of vehicles needed to satisfy the demand K is greater
than the number of vehicles serving the subsystem and K is no more than the
number of vehicles serving the subsystem.
• Case 1. The minimum number of vehicles needed to satisfy the demand is











represent the maximum number of
trips and minimum number of trips that a vehicle can finish in time interval
[t, t2], respectively. The total available vehicle capacity is greater than the











































































Therefore, inequality (2.12) is valid.
• Case 2. The minimum number of vehicles needed to satisfy the demand is
greater than the number of vehicles serving the subsystem, i.e.,K ≤ z .
– Case 2.1. RK − z′ is no greater than zero. The validity of inequality











































































So, W − (RK − z′) is greater than the LHS of (A.1). Therefore,
inequality (2.12) is valid.
Separation Procedure for Residual Capacity Inequality
Let key set KJ denote the collection of J ′′, set KJ = ∅.
For each job j∗ ∈ J with due period tj∗ , set the inequality violation




t=1 x̄qj∗t = 0,
∑






• Step 1. Sort the periods with positive forward flows to customer j∗ in the
decreasing order of
∑
q∈Q x̄qj∗t. Let m denote the number of periods with
positive flows to customer j∗, and T ′ = {t(1), t(2), ., t(m)} denote the sorted




q∈Q x̄qj∗t(2) ≥ ... ≥
∑
q∈Q x̄qj∗t(m) .
Set the time interval [t1, t2] = [t
(1), t(1)].
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• Step 2. For all t′ = t(2), ., t(m), if t′ /∈ [t1, t2],
– Step 2.1. set J ′ = J ′′ = {j∗}, Q′ = ∅; if t2 < t
′, set time interval
[t1, t2] = [t1, t
′]; if t′ < t1, set time interval [t1, t2] = [t
′, t2]; Add supplier
q to Q′ if x̄qj∗t2 > 0;
– Step 2.2. for t = t2 − 1 to t1, construct Q
′, J ′as follows.
∗ Customer subset J ′ construction. For all j not in J ′ with
∑
q∈Q′ ȳjqt >
0, identify the suppliers Q̄(j) serving the customer j in the time in-






















∗ Supplier subset Q′ construction. For all q not inQ′ with
∑
j∈J ′ x̄qjt >














– Step 2.3. Customer subset J ′ augmentation. For all j not in J ′, add













– Step 2.4. Supplier subset Q′ augmentation. For all q not in Q′, add
120




















– Step 2.5. Compute the number of vehicles (z) in the system and the
minimum number of vehicles (K) needed to satisfy the total demand






































t2 − t1 + 1
⌉
If z is fractional, go to step 2.6; otherwise, next t. if K > ⌈z⌉, next






– Step 2.6. For all j in J ′ not in J ′′ with fully met demand in the time
interval [t1, t2] , i.e., the proportion of satisfied demand equals one,
add j to J ′′.
Recompute the minimum number of vehicles (K) needed to satisfy
the total demand (W ) of customers in J ′′. If K < z, go to step 2.7; if
K > ⌈z⌉, next t; otherwise, go to step 2.8.
– Step 2.7. Sort the customers in J ′ not in J ′′ in the decreasing order
of the proportion of satisfied demand in the time interval, and add
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the customers in the sorted subset to subset J ′′ until the minimum
number of vehicles needed in order to meet the demand of customers
in J ′′ is ⌈z⌉, i.e., K = ⌈z⌉. If K > ⌈z⌉, next t.
– Step 2.8. Compute the inequality violation value










































































If ∆ < ∆j∗, record [t1, t2], Q
′, J ′, J ′′.
Next t′;
• Step 3. For J ′′ with the smallest ∆j∗(< 0), if J
′′ is not in the key set KJ , set
the inequality violation value for J ′′, ∆j′′ = ∆j∗, and record the associated
Q′, J ′, [t1, t2]; else, if ∆j∗ < ∆j′′ , set ∆j′′ = ∆j∗, and update Q
′, J ′, [t1, t2]
corresponding to J ′′ .
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For each subset J ′′ in the key set KJ , add the residual capacity inequalities
for the corresponding Q′, J ′, [t1, t2].
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Appendix B
Supplemental Material for Chapter 3
Proof of Lemma 3.3.1. Notice that (3.6) and (3.7) follow directly from
(3.1). We prove (3.8) by contradiction. Let k be the smallest integer such that
rjk − cjk > rjk+1 − cjk+1 . There are two cases: (1) k = m−1 or rjk − cjk > rji − cji
for i = k + 1, ..., m, or (2) otherwise.
In case (1), let S = {j1, ..., jk}. We have

































































Hence, S∗ cannot be optimal. In case (2), let l ∈ {k + 2, ..., m} be the smallest
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and the fact that
(rji −cji) < rjk −cjk < rjl −cjl for i = k+1, ..., l−1. Hence S
∗ cannot be optimal
and we have a contradiction.
Proof of Theorem 4.4.5. Let S = {j1, . . . , jm} with j1 < ... < jm and p(S)
be the path that corresponds to S, where p(S) = (0, 0) → (0, j1) → (j1, j2) →
...→ (jm−1, jm) → (jm, n+ 1) → (n+ 1, n+ 1). Let P be the set of paths. Every
set S that satisfies the condition of Lemma 3.3.1 corresponds to a path in P and
vice versa.
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The cost of path p(S) is equal to:

































Proof of Corollary 3.3.2. The complexity of a shortest path problem in
an acyclic network is bounded by the number of arcs (see Ahuja et al. (1993)
page 107). The graph has a special structure, because there is possibly an arc
between two nodes (i, j) to (l, k) only if j = l. There are at most j nodes that
end with product j ∈ {1, ...n} and these are connected to at most n+1− j nodes
that start with product j. Therefore the maximum number of arcs is equal to
2n +
∑n
j=1(n + 1 − j)j, where 2n is the maximum number of nodes leaving the
source or ending in the destination node. Hence, the maximum number of arcs
is O(n3).





[1 − F (θji)][θji(qji − qji−1) − (cji − cji−1)] −mK.
Taking the derivative of the expected profit with respect to rji for i =
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At the first order conditions (FOC), we have
θji = η(θji) +
cji − cji−1
qji − qji−1

















0 for k /∈ {i− 1, i}
−f(θji )
qji−qji−1
[η′(θji) − 1] > 0 for k = i− 1
f(θji )
qji−qji−1
[η′(θji) − 1] < 0 for k = i
Therefore, the Hessian matrix is negative definite and the solutions to
(B.1) determine the maximum. Since F is an IFR distribution, η(θ) is a de-
creasing function and therefore, each equation in (B.1) gives a unique solution.
Let θ∗ji , for i = 1, ..., m, denote the solutions to (B.1). By (4.1) and the defi-
nition of S∗, the solution must satisfy θ∗j1 < θ
∗
j2 < ... < θ
∗










< θ̄, which proves that (3.11) is a necessary
condition. Finally, (3.12) and (3.13) follow directly from (3.11).
Proof of Lemma 3.4.2. The proof of Lemma 3.4.1 shows that the first
order conditions determine the optimal solutions; therefore, the values of θ∗ji for
i = 1, ..., m can be obtained by solving (4.5). Moreover, we can get the prices ~r∗





for j = 1, ..., n.
Proof of Corollary 3.4.3. Notice that (3.16) follows directly from (3.15).
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) for i = 1, ..., m
which is strictly increasing in i.
Proof of Lemma 3.4.4. First we show that S∗ = {j1, ..., jm} with j1 < ... <
jm cannot contain a dominated product along with a product that dominates it.
Suppose not (contradiction), then there must exist ji and ji+1 such that ji+1
dominates ji. In this case we would have
cji+1−cji
qji+1−qji
< 0 which contradicts (3.11)
from Lemma 3.4.1.
Now, suppose S∗ contains a dominated product but the product(s) that
dominate(s) it are not in S∗. In this case, there must exists ji for some i = 1, ..., m




Let S = {j1, ..., ji−1, k, ji+1, ..., jm}. We know from Lemma 3.4.2 that, in
S∗, θ∗ji are obtained using (4.5). In S, let θjx = θ
∗
jx for x = 1, ..., i− 1, i+ 1, ...., m
and θk = θ
∗
ji
for i = 1, ..., m. We have
EΠ(S) − EΠ(S∗) = [1 − F (θ∗ji)][θ
∗
ji
(qk − qji) − (ck − cji)]
−[1 − F (θ∗ji+1)][θ
∗
ji+1
(qk − qji) − (ck − cji)]

































0 due to condition (B.2) and the FOC (B.1). Therefore, EΠ(S) − EΠ(S∗) > 0
due to the fact that θ∗ji+1 > θ
∗
ji
and qk > qji. Hence, S
∗ is not optimal, which is a
contradiction.
Proof of Theorem 3.4.1. The proof is very similar to that of Theorem 4.4.5
and is therefore omitted.
Proof of Corollary 3.4.5. The proof is very similar to that of Corollary
3.3.2 and is therefore omitted.
Proof of Lemma 3.4.6. Let j0 = 0. We first show that (4.4)-(3.19) are
necessary conditions. We prove (4.4) by contradiction, that is, suppose that S∗























Let S = {j1, ..., ji, k, ji+1, ..., jm}. We know from Lemma 3.4.2 that, in S
∗, θ∗ji are
obtained using (4.5). In S, let θji = θ
∗
ji







let θk be the solution to θk = η(θk)+
ck−cji
qk−qji
; otherwise, let θk be a value such that
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EΠ(S) − EΠ(S∗) = [1 − F (θk)][θk(qk − qji) − (ck − cji)]
−[1 − F (θ∗ji+1)][θ
∗
ji+1
(qk − qji) − (ck − cji)]





























If condition (B.4) is satisfied, then ψ′(θk) = 0 and ψ
′(θ) < 0 for θ > θk; other-
wise, ψ′(θ) ≤ 0 for θ ≥ θk, so ψ(θ) is decreasing in θ for θ ≥ θk. Therefore
EΠ(S) − EΠ(S∗) > 0 due to the fact that θ∗ji+1 > θk and qk > qji. Hence, S
∗ is
not optimal, which is a contradiction.
Finally, we prove that (3.19) is a necessary condition. Suppose (contra-




< θ̄. Let S = {j1, ..., jm, k}. In S, let θji = θ
∗
ji
for i = 1, ..., m and let
θk be any value such that θk <
ck−cjm
qk−qjm
< θ. We have
EΠ(S) − EΠ(S∗) = [1 − F (θk)] [θk(qk − qjm) − (ck − cjm)]







Therefore S∗ cannot be optimal and we have a contradiction.
Now we prove that (3.11), (4.4) and (3.19) are sufficient conditions by




1 , ..., j
1
m1} such that j
1






1 , ..., j
2
m2} such that
j21 < ... < j
2
m2 satisfying (3.11), (4.4) and (3.19).
If we have j1k = j
2














≥ θ̄. However this contradicts (3.11) for S∗2 . Therefore,
we exclude this case. Without loss of generality, let i be the smallest integer such
that j1k = j
2









this case let l be the smallest integer such that j1l ≥ j
2








































for i = 1, ..., l − 2 (B.5)






i , this contradicts with (4.4) for set S
∗
2 as














, with k = j1l−1. So let us assume that
j1l > j
2
i . Since S
∗





































































, which contradicts (4.4) for














with k = j1l−1.
Let us now consider Case (2), i.e., j1m1 < j
2
i . From (3.19) of set S
∗





































































θ̄, which is a contradiction.
Therefore, there exists only one set satisfying (3.11), (4.4) and (3.19), and
thus, if a set S∗ satisfies these conditions, then this set must be the only optimal
set.
Proof of corollary 3.4.7. Follows directly from Lemma 3.4.6.
Proof of Proposition 3.4.8. Let S∗ = {j1, ..., jm} with j1 < ... < jm.
To prove the optimality of S∗ we show that the conditions of Lemma 3.4.6 are
satisfied. Directly from the second inequality in Step 1 in the algorithm, we
obtain that (4.4) of Lemma 3.4.6 is satisfied.
We now prove by induction that (3.19) of Lemma 3.4.6 also holds. When
the algorithm stops, i = jm. If jm = n, then (3.19) is trivially true. If jm < n,
it must be that
cjm+1−cjm
qjm+1−qjm
≥ θ̄, since otherwise the algorithm would have added
jm + 1 to set S
∗. Now let us assume that
cy−cjm
qy−qjm
≥ θ̄ for y ∈ {jm + 1, ..., x} and




Because x + 1 was not added to set S∗ when i = jm, it must be that at









for some k ∈ {jm + 1, ..., x}.
















Hence, (3.19) of Lemma 3.4.6 also holds.
We now prove that (3.11) of Lemma 3.4.1 holds. Since, the algorithm
adds jm, it must be that
cjm−cjm−1
qjm−qjm−1





















The fact that the algorithm added jx to set S
∗ also implies that the fol-




















for k = jx−1 + 1, ..., jx − 1 (B.10)




















for k = jx−1 + 1, ..., jx − 1 (B.11)
Similarly, the fact that the algorithm added jx+1 to set S
∗ implies that




















for k = jx + 1, ..., jx+1 − 1 (B.13)






for k = jx + 1, ..., jx+1 − 1 (B.14)
However, if (B.7), (B.8), (B.11) and (B.14) were true, then the algorithm would
have added jx+1 instead of jx when i = jx−1. Therefore we have a contradiction.
Since (3.12) and (3.13) of Lemma 3.4.1 follow from (3.11), we have proven
that all five conditions of Lemma 3.4.6 are satisfied and therefore S∗ is optimal.
Proof of Corollary 3.4.9. In the worst-case scenario, Step 1 has to be
repeated for i going from 0 to n. In each iteration we may have to consider up
to n− i values of j.
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Proof of Corollary 3.4.10. First we show that for every k which satisfies
(4.4), there cannot be at least two θ values such that θqk−ck = maxi=1,...,n(θqi−ci).
Since qk > qji, we have θqk − ck < θqji − cji for θ <
ck−cji
qk−qji
. Since qk < qji+1, we
have θqk − ck < θqji+1 − cji+1 for θ >
cji+1−ck
qji+1−qk







Next we show that for every k that satisfies (3.19), there cannot be at
least two values of θ < θ such that θqk−ck = maxi=1,...,n(θqi−ci). Since qk > qjm ,
we have θqk − ck < θqjm − cjm for θ <
ck−cjm
qk−qjm




≥ θ. Finally we show that for every ji, i = 1, ..., m, there exists at
























Therefore, substituting (B.15) to (3.15) gives (3.20), which implies that r∗ji only
depends on cji and qji.
Proof of proposition 3.4.12. Lemma 3.4.11 indicates that the prices of
products in the optimal assortment are determined by (3.20), i.e., such that each
price is a function of its own cost and quality level only. Therefore, we can solve
the assortment planning problem with exogenous prices defined by (3.20).
Proof of Proposition 3.4.13. From Proposition 3.4.12, we know that the
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products that are offered are priced using (3.20). Let S = {j1, ..., jm} with j1 <




In other words, we have Pk({1, ..., n}) = 0 for k /∈ S. We show that S satisfies
the conditions of Lemmas 3.4.1 and 3.4.6.



















which is (3.11) from Lemma 3.4.1. The other conditions from Lemma 3.4.1 follow
from this one.












, which is (4.4) from
Lemma 3.4.6.
Now consider k such that k > jm. By definition of S, it must be that
rk−rjm
qk−qjm
≥ θ̄. Using condition (3.20), we get ck−cjm
qk−qjm
≥ θ̄, which is condition (3.19)
from Lemma 3.4.6.
It follows that S satisfies all the conditions of Lemma 3.4.6 and therefore
it is optimal.
Proof of Proposition 3.5.1. By Corollary 3.4.10, S∗
N
is such that for j ∈ S∗
N
,
there exists at least two values of θ ∈ [θ, θ] such that θqj − cj = maxi∈N(θqi − ci).
Consider j ∈ S∗
N
∩ N′, it must be true that there exists at least two values of






Supplemental Material for Chapter 4
Proof of Lemma 4.4.1. The result follows from Lemmas 3.4.1 and 3.4.6
Proof of Lemma 4.4.2. The result follows from Lemmas 3.4.1 and 3.4.6.
Proof of Lemma 4.4.3. Barghava & Choudhary (2001) show that (4.6) is
a sufficient condition. Next we show that (4.6) is a necessary condition, i.e., if
the optimal set S∗ includes the bundle, then condition (4.6) must be satisfied.
Suppose S∗ = {j1, ..., jm} such that j1 < j2 < ... < jm and jm is the
bundle, i.e., jm = n + 1. We first prove that
c{jm−1+1} + ...+ cjm
q{jm−1+1} + ...+ qjm
< θ (C.1)




c{jm−1+1} + ...+ cjm
q{jm−1+1} + ...+ qjm
> θ
which contradicts the fact that jm is included in S
∗. Hence, (C.1) holds.










for a, b, c, d > 0 along
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with (4.3), we obtain that
c{ji+1} + ... + cji+1
q{ji+1} + ... + qji+1
<
c{ji+1} + ...+ cjm
q{ji+1} + ...+ qjm
<
c{jm−1+1} + ...+ cjm
q{jm−1+1} + ...+ qjm
for i = 0, ..., m− 2 (C.2)
where cj0 = c0 = 0. Therefore, using (C.1) we get,
c{ji+1} + ...+ cjm
q{ji+1} + ...+ qjm
< θ̄ for i = 0, ..., m− 2 (C.3)
From (4.4), we get for i = 0, ..., m− 1
ck+1 + ... + cji+1
qk+1 + ... + qji+1
<
cji+1 + ...+ cji+1
qji+1 + ...+ qji+1
for k = ji + 1, ..., ji+1
And using (C.2), we obtain
ck+1 + ... + cji
qk+1 + ... + qji
<
c{ji+1} + ... + cjm
q{ji+1} + ... + qjm
for k = ji + 1, ..., ji+1
And therefore, for i = 0, ..., m− 1,
ck+1 + ... + cjm
qk+1 + ... + qjm
<
c{ji+1} + ...+ cjm
q{ji+1} + ...+ qjm
< θ̄ for k = ji + 1, ..., ji+1 (C.4)
We obtain the result by combining (C.3) and (C.4).
Proof of Proposition 4.4.4. This result follows directly from Theorem 1
from Barghava & Choudhary (2001).
Proof of Theorem 4.4.5. Let S = {j1, . . . , jm} with j1 < ... < jm. Let p(S)
be the path that corresponds to S, where p(S) = (0, 0) → (0, j1) → (j1, j2) →
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...→ (jm−1, jm) → (jm, n+2) → (n+2, n+2). Let P be the set of all admissible
paths, i.e., the paths with finite costs. Every set S that satisfies the condition of
Lemma 4.4.1 corresponds to a path in P and vice versa.
The cost of path p(S) is equal to:






rji−1+1 + .... + rji − (cji−1 + ...+ cji)
]









Proof of Corollary 4.4.6. The complexity of a shortest path problem in an
acyclic network is bounded by the number of arcs (see Ahuja et al. (1993) page
107). Due to the special structure, the number of arcs is O(n3).
Proof of proposition 4.4.7. The proof is similar to the proof of Proposition
3.4.8 of Chapter 3 , and is therefore omitted.
Proof of Proposition 4.4.8. The set {1, 2, ..., n} satisfies conditions (4.3)
and (4.4), therefore, it must be the optimal set according to Lemma 4.4.1.
In the presence of the bundle, by Lemma 4.4.3, condition (4.6) implies
that it is optimal to stock the bundle. Suppose the optimal set in the presence
of the bundle does not include a component k, where 1 ≤ k < j, i.e., S∗
′
=





, which contradicts condition (4.8). Therefore we must have
S∗
′
= {1, ..., j, n + 1}. Moreover, Lemma 4.4.1 implies that product j is not
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cj+2 + ...+ cn
qj+2 + ...+ qn+1
.




j denote the optimal θ value in the absence




1 , ..., r
∗′
j
denote the optimal price in the absence of the bundle and in the presence of bundle
respectively. Lemma 4.4.2 implies that
θi = θ
′
i for i = 1, ..., j
ri = r
′
i for i = 1, ..., j
.
Proof of Proposition 4.5.1 . By Lemma 4.4.3, (4.10) is the necessary
and sufficient condition for the bundle to be included in the optimal solution.
We first prove the results when condition (4.10) is satisfied. we suppose S∗ =











qi+1 + ... + qi+k
<
l − k
qi+k+1 + ...+ qi+l
which contradicts condition 4.4 of Lemma 4.4.1. Therefore, the optimal set in-
cludes the first j components, i.e. S∗ = {1, ..., j, n+1}. Moreover, j must satisfy
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qj+1 + ...+ qn+1
and the set cannot be optimal from Lemma 4.4.1.
Next we prove that ĵ is the largest integer satisfies condition (4.11). Sup-
pose ĵ is not the largest integer such that condition (4.11) is satisfied. There





qk+1 + ...+ qn+1
(C.5)












, combining with condition (C.5), we have
k − j
qj+1 + ...+ qk
<
(n− k)
qk+1 + ... + qn+1
which contradicts with condition (4.4) of Lemma 4.4.1, for all ĵ < k < n+ 1,
k − j
qj+1 + ...+ qk
>
n− k
qk+1 + ... + qn+1
. Hence, ĵ is the largest integer satisfying condition (4.11).
If no positive integer satisfying condition (4.11), then from condition (4.3)
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of Lemma 4.4.1, the optimal set does not include any individual component.
Intuitively, if the average component quality in the bundle is the highest, then
the firm should not offer individual components.
Now we prove the results when condition (4.10) is not satisfied. By Lemma
4.4.3, we know the optimal set does not include the bundle. By the same reasoning
as shown above, we know the optimal set S∗ = {1, ..., j̃} where j̃ is the largest




Proof of Proposition (4.5.2). when condition 4.13 is satisfied, then the













′(θn+1) − 1] < 0 for j = 0, ..., n− 1
so all the points satisfying the FOC conditions are local maximum points and we
compare the expected profit at those points to get the global optimal point.
Proof of Proposition 4.5.3. Set c = 0, inequality (4.7) always holds and
the result follows from proposition 4.4.4.
Proof of Proposition 4.5.4.
∂EΠ
∂Rn+1
= 1 − F (θn+1) − f(θn+1)θn+1
= [1 − F (θn+1)] [1 − ξ(θn+1)]
In this case, ξ(θn+1) is non-decreasing in θ, and
∂2EΠ
∂R2n+1
≤ 0 so that EΠ is concave
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in Rn+1 and θ
∗
n+1 is the unique solution to the FOC.
Proof of Proposition 4.5.5. Note that both EΠ and Rn+1 are continuous







= jr + (Qn+1 −Qj)θ
∗
n+1





















(1 − F (θi))r











Hence, it is enough to consider only the first derivative when looking at the
impact of changes in qn+1, qj , and r.









0. So, EΠ∗ and R∗n+1 are both increasing in qn+1.
We vary qj for some j while keeping q1, ..., qj−1, qj+1, ...qn constant. Be-
cause the products are always numbered such that q1 ≥ q2 ≥ ... ≥ qn, it is enough
to consider varying qj ∈ [qj+1, qj−1) for j = 1, ..., n with q0 = ∞.
There are two cases:
• Case 1: j is such that θj ≤ θ
∗












• Case 2: j is such that θj > θ
∗





θ∗n+1 > 0 and
∂EΠ∗
∂qj
= (1 − F (θ∗n+1))θ
∗
n+1 > 0.
Hence, EΠ∗ is increasing in qj and r
∗
b is non-decreasing in qj .
Regarding r, we have
∂R∗n+1
∂r





i=1(1 − F (θi)) ≥
0. Hence, EΠ∗ and R∗n+1 are both non-decreasing in r. In particular they are






then constant in r for r > q1θ
∗
n+1.
Proof of Proposition 4.5.6. By Proposition 4.5.4, θ∗n+1 is unique and such




















0 if r∗b ≤ t1
∑j
i=1 [1 − F (θi) − θif(θi)]
if tj < r
∗
b ≤ min{tj+1, t̄}, j = 1, ...,m
∑n
i=1 [1 − F (θi) − θif(θi)] if t̄ < r
∗
b














is therefore optimal to set r so high that no customer buys individual components,
i.e., pure bundling is the best strategy.
Proof of Proposition 4.5.7. Suppose such a mixed bundling strategy is
optimal for a particular distribution and the maximum is achieved at θ∗b2 and r
∗.
Let g(θ) = ∂EΠ
∂Rn+1
= 1 − F (θ) − θf(θ), then g(θ) > 0 and g(θ) < 0. we have the
following two cases.
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• Case 1: θ∗b2 is the single local maximum point, then g(θ
∗
b2) ≥ 0 and g(θ) ≥ 0
for θ ≤ θ∗b2, so EΠ increases in r and the pure bundling strategy is optimal,
contradicting with optimal mixed bundling strategy.
• Case 2: θ∗b2 is one of the local maximum points. θ
∗
b2 cannot be the first
local maximum point due to the reason shown in Case 1. Suppose θ∗b2 is
the second local maximum point. Let θ∗b1 be the first local maximum point.
Then, θ∗b1 is the local maximum point for pure bundling strategy.
We first show that r∗ = θ∗b1q1. Since there are two local maximum points,
g(θ) < 0 for θ∗b1 < θ < θ
′ and g(θ) > 0 for θ > θ′, where θ′ ≤ θ∗b2.
– Case 1: r∗ cannot be in the interval (0, θ∗b1q1) because EΠ increases in
r for 0 ≤ r < θ∗b1q1.
– Case 2: r∗ cannot be in the interval (θ∗b1q1, θ
′q1) because EΠ decrease
in r for θ∗b1q1 < r < θ
′q1.
– Case 3: r∗ cannot be in the interval [θ′q1, θ
∗
b2q1]. If r
∗ is in this interval,
then EΠ increases in r for θ′q1 ≤ r ≤ θ
∗
b2q1 and r
∗ = θ∗b2q1 which means
pure bundling strategy is optimal.
Therefore, r∗ = θ∗b1q1. We next show if θ
∗
b2 achieves the maximum, we get
contradiction. Let R∗b1 and R
∗
b2 denote the optimal bundle price correspond-
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∗) = (1 − F (θ∗b2))(Qn+1 −Q2)θ
∗















1 − F (θ∗b2)




∗) = (1 − F (θ∗b2))(Qn+1 −Q1)θ
∗











1 − F (θ∗b2)
1 − F (θ∗b1)
(C.7)
Condition C.7 contradicts with condition C.6; therefore, this mixed bundling
strategy cannot be optimal.
Using the similar reasoning, we can prove that if θ∗b2 is any other local maximum
point, we get contradictions too.
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